The past months have seen the programme visit three communities where we have not previously been: Middleburg, Montagu and Port Alfred. Their picturesque surroundings belie the problems experienced by residents. In all of the communities, poverty and unemployment loom large over the lives of residents. The lack of opportunities, especially outside of urban areas, means that youth in particular, are unable to make the most of the talents that they possess. Each of the areas are unique, yet the same refrain could be heard in the three communities: the past lives in the present and, if not addressed, will become the future too.

In Middleburg, the programme supported the launch of the Just Energy Transition (JET) toolkit. That area of the country is coal-mining territory and the transition to a just energy future is complicated. The potential for loss of employment is high and needs to be dealt with delicately. As a society we would be remiss if we were to close down a means of livelihood without providing a viable alternative that will benefit both the community and the environment. Lack of access to information and top-down decision making are two of the prominent challenges which need to be tackled. The toolkit aims to assist communities in with these problems to enable a more just and democratic approach to solving the problems.

In Montagu and Port Alfred alike, lack of information and the need for community engagement in decisions which affect them were highlighted in different ways. In Montagu, the rich history in the area has been lost and the memory of those who come before has been silenced. Local antagonisms speak to the larger problem of racism and xenophobia in our society, which is unabated and insidious.

Addiction in communities came up in conversations in both Montagu and Port Alfred. Trauma and circumstance are both the cause and effect of substance abuse. The courageous sharing of participants of their daily struggles is a testimony to the resilience they have, and a sad indictment on our society and collective failure to create communities where people can thrive and live in dignity.

There were so many take-aways from each of the visits, but perhaps the most startling was the need of communities to have safe spaces to talk. So often the simplest of interventions are overlooked. A basic human need is to be heard and understood. We need to listen to what communities are asking for and supporting them on their journey. We look forward to doing this in these communities in the coming years.

Felicity Harrison Head: Sustained Dialogues Programme at the IJR

The views and opinions expressed in the article are solely that of the author, and not the IJR.

The world’s institutions are ill-prepared and inadequately designed to effectively address global challenges such as major power conflict, pandemics, the climate catastrophe, refugee crisis, violent extremism, illicit profiteering from natural resources and the regulation of artificial intelligence systems. In particular, the United Nations (UN), which was created to address the problems of the world in 1945, is no longer fit for purpose in the twenty-first century. Previous efforts to reform the UN Security Council have exposed the limited imagination that is symptomatic of an international system that has confined itself to repeating and reproducing an outdated paradigm of international relations. In effect, the UN Charter has not undergone any meaningful review since the organisation was established almost eight decades ago. The case for a complete overhaul is therefore more urgent than ever. This article will assess the urgency of invoking Article 109 of the United Nations Charter, which calls for a review of the international organisation.

From the early decades of the UN, there was an asymmetrical relationship between the body and the African continent. Newly independent African were just beginning to establish their political, social, and economic footing, but were not in a position to influence policy at the UN, notably in framing how decisions were made in the institution. In most instances, post-colonial African were beholden, and still are, at least economically, to their former colonial powers and the contemporary major powers. This further contributes toward the perpetuation of a “paternal” attitude by the UN system toward Africa and its Diaspora. Since then, Africa has been trying to challenge and dispense with paternalistic attitudes from, and within, the UN system.

A transitional justice approach to transforming multilateralism recognizes that the UN system is un-democratic in its current design, and the P5 of the UN Security Council wield a disproportionate degree of illegitimate power, which undermines the peace and security of Africa and the rest of the world. The optics of the United Kingdom and France, both with populations of only 67 million people each, sitting on the UN Security Council, when Africa a continent of 1.4 billion people – which occupies 60% of the Council’s work – does not have a permanent seat, clearly illustrate the illegitimacy and lack of credibility of the current multilateral system. Consequently, when a transitional justice prism is applied to critique the un-democratic nature of the UN system, with a specific focus on the UN Security Council, then there is a strong case for the fundamental transformation of multilateralism to ensure the inclusion of societies, in the creation of new institutions that are reflective of the needs of the twenty-first century.

The founders of the UN recognized that the moment would arrive when it became imperative to transform the organization. For this, they included a practical mechanism to review the body’s Charter. According to Article 109 (1), a UN Charter Review Conference should have been convened 10 years after the signing of the document. While there was an initial effort to convene a conference in 1955, it was subsequently undermined by the geo-politics of the day. Given the current dissatisfaction of so many UN Member States with the structure and functioning of the UN and especially the Security Council, the procedural barriers to launch a Charter Review Conference seem more manageable than ever.

The transformation of multilateralism requires invoking a United Nations Charter Review Conference, through Article 109, which cannot be vetoed by the Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council. A UN Charter Review process would require extensive analysis, policy engagement and global civic education interventions. One of the prospective outcomes of a UN Charter Review process could be the establishment of a World Parliament, to broaden the multilateral decision-making processes and include a wider range of countries and global citizens in reflecting and deciding on how to address continental and global challenges, including ongoing peace, security and transitional justice processes that are being implemented in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, West Africa and Southern Africa.

The formal adoption of the AU Transitional Justice Policy, in February 2019, a policy shift labelled as a “game changer” has provided a framework to engage national governments, regional economic communities, civil society networks, analysts and other stakeholders on the importance of implementing processes that address the legacies of the past as a means to maintaining international and continental peace and security in Africa. It is necessary for governmental, inter-governmental, and civil society actors to utilize the provisions of the AUTJP and leverage them to inform policy debates relating to the transformation of the international multilateral system. to advance an improved understanding of the need to address the historical legacy of exclusion and the need to address the marginalization of the past. In this regard, we can draw upon the provisions of the AUTJP, to contribute towards promoting peace and security at a national, regional and continental level.

Prof. Tim Murithi, Head IJR Peacebuilding Interventions Programme, @tmurithi12

The views and opinions expressed in the article are solely that of the author, and not the IJR

As we approach the end of 2023, the Data for Governance Alliance in Africa (D4GA), of which the IJR is a consortium partner, can look back on a highly productive year. During the course of this year, our team has continued to build on the foundations that were laid in 2022 to enhance democratic governance through the use appropriate use of data for policymaking purposes. In the paragraphs below, we report on some of the highlights of the past six months.

In July, the project participated in the Charter Africa Tanzania Dialogue, which was hosted by our sister project Charter Africa in Tanzania on July 6th. Our team shared key insights on the democratic trends in Tanzania, emanating from the Afrobarometer Survey, with Tanzianian civil society group, which contributed to lively discussions on the state of democratic governance in Tanzania. Shortly thereafter, on July 10th, the D4GA team took part in the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) Anti-Corruption Celebrations, where it shared data on perceptions about corruption across Africa, illuminating some of the challenges that ordinary Africans perceive in terms of their exposure to corruption, as well as their impressions about official efforts to counter this scourge. Towards the end of July, the team made several inputs to another Charter Africa, this time in South Africa, where the emphasis fell on the quality and challenges for democracy in the South African context as the country approaches the three- decade mark since its’s political transition.

Adding to the project’s achievements, it launched the D4G Advocacy Manual in August. The manual, which was launched during a webinar has been designed as a tool for articulating data- based advocacy and engagement between African CSOs and the African Union. The event saw the D4GA consortium showcasing how CSOs can effectively utilize the manual to enhance their advocacy work on human rights, democracy, and governance in Africa. Representatives of CSOs and AU welcomed the valuable insights and recommendations provided by the newly launched advocacy manual.

Also in August, the project made presentations to the Regional Workshop on Communication and Collaboration, which was hosted by Good Governance Africa. The workshop aimed to enhance communication and collaboration between Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and government entities and served as a platform to showcase our advocacy manual’s relevance in promoting good governance and transparency.

September saw the hosting of the D4GA Southern Africa Convening. This collaborative effort brought together diverse Southern African Pan-African CSOs and participants from various African Union organs to deliberate on effective use of data for policymaking purposes. The event culminated in the formulating of a collaborative data-driven advocacy strategy to address critical governance challenges across the continent.

Also in September, our Project Leader, Nyasha Mpani, attended the Political Regression and Transitional Justice Learning Exchange which was hosted by Global initiative for Justice, Truth and Reconciliation (GIJTR) in Cape Town. The workshop hosted academics, researchers, CSO representatives, working in a range of areas that include gender justice advocates, victim’s advocates, data experts, legal advisors, and more general peace process professionals. During the workshop, Mr Mpani made a presentation on the power of information sharing and how organizations can leverage data and media for advocacy, drawing from our recently launched D4GA Advocacy Manual.

In October, we expanded our engagement by conducting the West Africa Convening in Accra. Approximately 35 representatives from AU member organs and West African CSOs participated, receiving hands-on training in evidence-based advocacy planning and the utilization of empirical data.

Our journey continued with the Amani Africa Training in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from November 6 to 8, which was attended by our project Leader, Nyasha Mpani. This training focused on key African Union themes like African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), #Agenda2063, African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP), the role and mandate of African Union ECOSOCC, African Union position on climate change, coups, elections, term limits, civic space, and its role in reshaping the multilateral system. It provided participants with valuable insights which will pave the way for innovative engagement strategies with the African Union.

On the 6th-10th November the D4GA hosted the 2nd Stakeholder Convening in Nairobi, Kenya. The Nairobi convening offered hands-on training in data analysis, data-based advocacy and effective communications to Pan-African Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Participants engaged with the Afrobarometer online data analysis tool and the AfricanLii platform that houses thousands of African Union legal documents. This practical experience has informed advocacy campaigns addressing critical issues, including youth empowerment, climate change, unconstitutional changes of government, elections, and child welfare.

Later in November, during the 42nd Ordinary Session of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) from the 9th to the 11th, D4GA actively participated in various activities. A significant highlight was the presentation and launch of our data on child welfare in Africa, accompanied by the unveiling of our first-ever child welfare scorecards which we strongly believe they will go a long way in protecting the rights of children in Africa.

During the same month the project also participated in the inaugural Data Governance Innovation Forum #DGIFA2023 in Addis Ababa which was hosted by GIZ at the African Union. Our Project Leader, participated in a panel discussion on youth and data governance and emphasized the crucial role of youth in shaping the African Union Data policy framework, sharing Afrobarometer data on youth digitization.

At the end of November, the D4GA team wrapped up the quarter with our Project Leader travelling to Midrand in October to attend the joint meetings of the standing committee of the Pan African Parliament. Representing Data for Governance Alliance, he presented our data on migration and unconstitutional changes of government for consideration by the committees.

In closing, as we bid farewell to an eventful year, the impact of the Data for Governance Alliance in Africa reverberates across the continent. Our engagements in various dialogues, convenings, and initiatives have not only contributed to a deeper understanding of democratic trends, corruption challenges, and key governance issues but have also fostered tangible change. From the launch of our Advocacy Manual to the collaborative data-driven strategies formulated during the three regional convenings, we see the seeds of positive transformation taking root. The presentations, workshops, and active participation in regional and continental events have positioned D4GA as a catalyst for informed policymaking and advocacy. As we move forward, we remain committed to leveraging data for the betterment of governance, and we express our sincere gratitude for your unwavering support. The impact of our collective efforts is a testament to the potential for positive change, and we eagerly anticipate the opportunities and challenges that the upcoming year holds. Wishing you all a merry Christmas and a prosperous new year filled with continued collaboration and impactful endeavours.

Nyasha Mcbride Mpani is the Project Leader for the Data for Governance Alliance in Africa Project at the IJR

The views and opinions expressed in the article are solely that of the author, and not the IJR

In Kenya, the prosecution of Pastor Paul Mackenzie, who urged more than 400 followers to fast to death in the Shakahola forest to “meet Jesus”, is underway. MacKenzie faces possible terrorism charges, among others. The trial illustrates the potential for extremism to take root across all sides of the ideological and religious spectrums, with implications for programming. Kenya has come leaps and bounds in its approach, adopting a National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in 2016, and then moving to develop more localised county action plans that involve a wide variety of stakeholders, and that are more relevant to the unique context. However, the Kenyan government’s predominant focus is on Al-Shabaab, who continues to be responsible for attacks, particularly in Lamu county by the Somalian border, with growing concerns that attacks may increase as the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia draws to a close in December 2024. It can be argued that many of the methodologies employed by MacKenzie’s church are similar to those of Al-Shabaab, in that they employ rigid belief systems and manipulate religious texts, and thus the trial is a reminder that extremism can take many forms. As such, is a need to deepen consultation and participation on Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) across different communities.

In August 2023, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation undertook research in the Nairobi, Mombasa and Lamu counties of Kenya, in partnership with Kenyan researchers Faith Ondeng and Wilfred Muliro. This forms part of a project entitled ‘Shifting Narratives on Violent Extremism in Africa’, undertaken in partnership with the Open Society Africa. Its main objective is to produce alternative narratives about and approaches to PVE in Africa, thereby contributing towards sustainable peacebuilding that includes gender-sensitive and survivor-centered transitional justice and reconciliation processes.

Kenya has been subject to instability from Al-Shabaab for several decades, which increased substantially after the Kenyan Defence Force sent troops into Somalia in 2011. Ah-Shabaab was born following the ousting of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia in 2006 by an Ethiopian-led military, supported by the United States, who were concerned over the possibility of an Islamist foothold in the Horn of Africa. Thus, Kenya’s support to the transitional government in Somalia was used as a narrative to generate support for Al-Shabaab in Kenya, with the government of Kenya portrayed as an enemy of Islam. Kenya became a key partner for the war on terror, with strong connections to the United States and United Kingdom, as well as other Western partners. After the devastating 2013 attack on Westgate Shopping Mall, as well as subsequent attacks including Mpeketoni attacks of 2014, the multiple Mandera attacks of 2014 and the Garissa University College attacks of 2015, Kenya adopted strong counter-terrorism measures including new laws and strong counter-terrorism operations. Yet the approach was criticised as being discriminatory against Muslims and led to mass defiance, including through online media, where the hashtag #KenyaIAmNotATerrorist became a powerful slogan.

As a result, Kenya moved towards a more comprehensive approach to countering and then preventing violent extremism through the development of its national and county action plans. The national action plan has nine pillars: media and online; psychosocial; education; legal and policy; arts and culture; training and capacity building; political; faith based and ideological; and security and county action plans can adapt these pillars as they choose. The plans have been widely embraced and held up as examples to others who may want to follow in their footsteps, since they provide clear platforms for knowledge sharing, assign responsibilities for action, promote collaboration, and avoid a duplication of responsibility. They have also developed trust between communities and government stakeholders, such as through community policing efforts, engagement with religious leaders, and the development of educational and vocational training schemes to address issues of unemployment.

And yet, more can be done to ensure that these plans are adaptive and flexible to an ever-changing context. For example, youths can be better included and involved in these action plans to keep abreast of the types of recruitment narratives being used, and the specific grievances that young people have. Counter-narrative messaging can be strengthened by involving youths on the use of the latest social media platforms. There is also a need to strengthen understandings of the gendered dimensions of extremism, as well as to involve mothers of those recruited to understand youth vulnerabilities. Moreover, there have been criticisms that, because the national and county plans on extremism are predominantly externally funded, they tend to use the term synonymously with Salafi-Wahhabi oriented Islamist extremist trends, with erroneous profiling of any Salafi-Wahhabi group as suspicious. A better approach therefore is for communities themselves to define exactly what extremism is for their own context.

There are also some issues in Kenya which remain unaddressed – in the wake of Kenya’s strong counter-terrorism response, a number of forced disappearances took place. The families of the dead and disappeared are not entitled to any form of recognition, and struggle to access legal documents such as birth certificates and bank accounts. If not properly managed, these grievances have the potential to deepen. There is also no clear process or framework to deal with the issue of defectors, known locally as returnees. This is problematic as there are differential layers of responsibility for those associated with violent extremist groups, from sympathisers to those forcibly recruited, to those that have never committed a serious crime but are disillusioned. UNDP’s report, Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, has shown that most people voluntarily disengage as a result of government incentives and amnesties. Currently, it appears that defectors return in a very haphazard manner, causing the potential for conflict.

In moving forward, the Kenyan government needs to ensure that it applies the values upheld in its Constitution to all. This will ensure that it is perceived as treating all ethnic groups as fairly. Its national and county action plans have illustrated the benefits of involving multiple stakeholders in the prevention and countering of extremism, but this should be strengthened and widened to keep abreast of changing narratives and approaches.

By Amanda Lucey

The views and opinions expressed in the article are solely that of the author, and not the IJR

As South Africa prepares to commemorate the National Day of Reconciliation on the 16th of December – as well as the hard-won Rugby World Cup holiday – the IJR proudly announces the release of the 2023 South African Reconciliation Barometer survey.

Origins of the Barometer

The Barometer was first conducted in 2003 and is among the longest-running IJR interventions, designed to measure public opinion in the years following South Africa’s transition to democracy and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process.

Now in its 20th year, the Barometer has become a critical resource for civil society organisations, government, academics and researchers locally and worldwide. It has also inspired numerous other reconciliation barometers in a host of other post-conflict societies, and the IJR has partnered in developing peer projects in Sri Lanka and Rwanda.

Measuring reconciliation

The Barometer measures reconciliation through six conceptual domains: political culture, inclusion, apartheid legacy, racial reconciliation, social cohesion, and perceptions of change. These have been continually reviewed and validated over the two decades of the project. This year’s survey included over 200 new and legacy questions. The questionnaire was translated from English into six additional languages—Afrikaans, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Setswana, Sepedi and Sesotho.

Data collection was conducted between August and September across all nine provinces of the country, and a total of 2,006 South Africans participated in face-to-face interviews. The nationally-representative sampling methodology means that every adult South African has equal chance of being selected, and results can be used to draw conclusions about the entire population of the country.

Spotlight on elections

This year’s biggest public opinion shifts are evident in the political culture domain.
South Africa has experienced years of declining voter turnout at national and provincial elections – as well as lower numbers of ballots cast for the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party. The upcoming 2024 polls are set to be highly contested, with a coalition of opposition parties vying for the electoral majority.

Barometer results show that 70% of South Africans say they are likely to vote in 2024. If this translated into action on election day, turnout may exceed the 66% recorded at the 2019 polls. Almost a third (32%) of South Africans answered that they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the far-left Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – up from 20% six years ago in 2017.

This year’s survey also found South Africans to be highly distrusting of others at present – and this is particularly pronounced in attitudes about leadership. Around eight in ten people agree that national leaders are not concerned about what happens to ordinary people (81%) and cannot be trusted to do the right thing (79%).

Confidence in a range of important public institutions has also dropped over successive survey rounds and concern about corruption is widespread. These dramatic findings pose challenges to further progress in reconciliation.

Persistent economic inequality

After almost 30 years of democracy, South Africa remains among the most unequal societies in the world.

Many still live in deep poverty and according to the 2023 Barometer, in the past year one in four (25%) South Africans experienced food insecurity and 44% went without a cash income (several times, many times or always). Survey data also confirms statistically significant differences in poverty, household living conditions and relative financial circumstances between people of different races.

South Africans have consistently identified the gap between rich and poor as the biggest source of division in the country since the first survey round in 2003. Many view the country as fractured, with 49% in 2023 describing South Africa as either somewhat or very divided.

Resilient truths about the past

The recently-released 2022 Census confirmed that so-called “born free” South Africans now outnumber older generations with lived memories of apartheid.

The Barometer found – not unexpectedly – that younger South Africans were less aware of key historical periods and institutions – including colonialism, apartheid and the TRC – than their older counterparts. A dedicated ministerial task team recommended in 2018 that history should become a compulsory high school subject but this has not happened to date.

Yet even with the passing of time, changing national demographics, pervasive distrust and deep dividing lines, the 2023 Barometer also revealed a resilient consensus over the truths about the country’s past. This has remained largely intact since the survey began.

Around eight in ten South Africans South Africans still agree that apartheid was a crime against humanity (79%) and that the state oppressed the majority of people in the country (80%). Comparable percentages agree that the state committed terrible crimes against anti-apartheid activists (82%) and that it is still important to support victims of human rights abuses (81%) that occurred during that time.

Although opinion has fluctuated at times over the two decades of the project, this lasting majority agreement is an important finding and provides a foundation for ongoing policy decisions in areas such as restitution and transformation.

Prospects for unity

The Barometer also continues to find consistently high levels of support for a shared South African identity – and not just in light of the Rugby World Cup victory.

Most people (86%) agree that being South African is an important part of how they see themselves, and this hasn’t been dampened by strong positive associations with other identity groups. A further three-quarters (75%) of South Africans think a united country is desirable and 72% believe this is possible in the future.

Looking to the future

The 2023 Barometer results show that there is still a great deal holding South Africans together and that considerable progress has been made in some aspects of reconciliation.

Maintaining and advancing this progress, however, requires urgent work to create a more inclusive, equitable economy and build trust in government, leadership and one other.

The IJR has begun planning for the next decade of the Reconciliation Barometer, which will involve new research, collaborative partnerships, and the archiving and sharing our historic data on this unique period in South African history.

All previous Barometer data is freely available to the public through our online analysis portal here. The full 2023 survey report is available here. For further information, please contact Kate Lefko-Everett on kleverett@ijr.org.za.

By: Kate Lefko-Everett

The views and opinions expressed in the article are solely that of the author, and not the IJR