The provincial dialogues form part of a national initiative led by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in partnership with the South African Women in Dialogue (SAWID) and supported by the Embassy of Ireland in South Africa. Held under the theme “Building an Infrastructure for Peace: A Dialogue on Peacebuilding,” the engagements are part of IJR’s Ireland-funded project, Promoting the Women and Youth Peace and Security Agendas. The initiative seeks to strengthen community peacebuilding, conflict prevention and inclusive participation while ensuring that women’s experiences and priorities inform both local and national decision-making processes.

The series began in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, on 7 August 2026, bringing together women from civil society organisations, faith-based institutions, traditional leadership structures, academia and community peacebuilding networks. Participants reflected on the challenges confronting communities and explored pathways towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion. Discussions focused on conflict prevention, community safety, women’s participation in peacebuilding and the localisation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

The second engagement took place in Cape Town on 18 August, where women from diverse sectors gathered to contribute recommendations to South Africa’s evolving National Dialogue process. Opening the dialogue, Dr Fanie Du Toit, Interim Executive Director of IJR, and Ms Felicity Harrison, Senior Practitioner at IJR, emphasised the importance of strengthening peacebuilding from the community level upward and amplifying women’s voices in conversations about governance, social cohesion and democratic participation. Dr Du Toit highlighted the enduring significance of South Africa’s Constitution as a foundation for inclusion, justice and peacebuilding.

Participants were welcomed by Ms Caroline Peters, SAWID Western Cape Provincial Coordinator, while messages of support were delivered by Ms Mandisa Khanyile of the Civil Society National Dialogue Caucus and Ms Laura Baartman, Deputy Director for Court Preparation at the Western Cape National Prosecuting Authority. Speakers underscored the importance of collaboration, community-centred leadership and collective action to address the root causes of violence, exclusion and social fragmentation.

The provincial series concluded in Johannesburg on 21 August, where women leaders and community representatives gathered at the historic Trevor Huddleston CR Memorial Centre in Sophiatown for the Gauteng Provincial Dialogue on Peacebuilding. Sophiatown provided a powerful symbolic backdrop for discussions on peace, equality and democratic participation. As a place deeply associated with resistance, resilience and cultural diversity, the venue reinforced the connection between South Africa’s historic struggle for dignity and contemporary efforts to build peaceful, inclusive communities.

Opening the Gauteng dialogue, Ms Felicity Harrison, Senior Practitioner at IJR, and Ms Ndivhuho Sekoba, SAWID Gauteng Provincial Coordinator, stressed the importance of creating platforms that enable women to contribute meaningfully to conversations on peacebuilding, governance and social cohesion. They reaffirmed the critical role women continue to play in strengthening communities and advancing sustainable peace.

A message of support was delivered by Ms Maeve McLynn, Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Ireland in South Africa, who reminded participants that peace cannot be taken for granted. She highlighted the value of inclusive dialogue, collective leadership and community-centred approaches to addressing the social and economic challenges confronting women and communities across South Africa.

Across all three provincial engagements, participants engaged in a participatory process rooted in reflection, healing, dialogue and collective problem-solving. A central discussion, “The Constitutional Vision Revisited,” invited participants to reflect on the promises of democracy, equality, dignity and justice enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution. Women examined the barriers that continue to prevent many communities from fully realising these rights and explored how peacebuilding approaches can help bridge the gap between constitutional ideals and lived realities.

The dialogues form part of a broader strategy to localise the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, strengthen provincial peacebuilding networks, identify drivers of conflict and social fragmentation, and develop recommendations that can contribute meaningfully to South Africa’s National Dialogue process. The initiative builds on a continuum of IJR’s work advancing the Women, Peace and Security and Youth, Peace and Security agendas, anchored in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and South Africa’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. It also draws on lessons from previous initiatives supported by the Embassy of Ireland, including Women and Youth Peace Labs, engagements with women church and traditional leaders, the Women’s Pre-National Dialogue, and consultations through the Civil Society Peace Table.

Recommendations emerging from the three provincial engagements will be consolidated and channelled into broader national conversations on peace, inclusion and democratic participation. Together, the dialogues seek to ensure that women’s perspectives and priorities are reflected in South Africa’s National Dialogue process and in broader efforts to build a more peaceful, just and inclusive society.

As the provincial dialogue series draws to a close, one message has emerged consistently from Durban, Cape Town and Sophiatown: Peacebuilding is not only a national imperative but also a community responsibility.

The one-day workshop brought together emerging and established scholars to explore the historical, legal, political and moral dimensions of reparations, while reflecting on the opportunities and challenges of building a coherent Pan-African reparations agenda. The gathering forms part of broader efforts to deepen scholarly engagement on questions of justice, redress, restitution and socio-economic transformation in Africa and beyond.

In his role as co-convenor, Prof Tim Murithi, IJR’s Senior Advisor for Transitional Justice and Research Associate at UCT’s IDCPPA, welcomed participants and highlighted the importance of creating platforms for rigorous dialogue on reparative justice. The workshop provided an opportunity for interdisciplinary engagement among researchers working on issues ranging from economic and ecological reparations to cultural restitution and restorative justice.

The initiative seeks to contribute to growing continental and global conversations on reparative justice, particularly in light of the emerging global reparatory moment and renewed calls for redress linked to slavery, colonialism, apartheid and systemic racial oppression. It provided an important space to map current reparations activism, strengthen research networks and advance scholarship capable of informing policy and advocacy processes.

Participants engaged in robust discussions on the future of reparations research in Africa, including the need for interdisciplinary collaboration, stronger engagement with policymakers and the development of inclusive frameworks that reflect the diverse experiences of African communities and the Global African Diaspora.

The initiative established the UCT-IJR Working Group on Reparations which will convene regularly and also actively work to strengthen research networks dedicated to advancing restorative and transformative approaches to justice across Africa and the wider diaspora.

The workshop concluded with a roundtable discussion on future directions for reparations research in Africa, providing participants with an opportunity to identify emerging priorities and explore avenues for collaborative scholarship, advocacy and policy engagement.

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) co-convened the Ukrainian Winter School on Ukrainian and Southern Africa Strategic Futures with the Ukrainian Association of South Africa (UAZA), the University of Pretoria, the University of Cape Town, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in South Africa. The school was held from 4 to 6 August 2026 in Stellenbosch, bringing together scholars, policymakers, civil society leaders, and practitioners to explore shared challenges and opportunities in peacebuilding, transitional justice, and long-term strategic resilience. The initiative sought to deepen comparative learning between Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to address the consequences of conflict and Southern Africa’s experiences in conflict transformation, reconciliation, and institutional reform.

The Winter School provided a unique platform to foster dialogue and collaboration between Ukrainian and African institutions. Participants examined ways to strengthen intellectual and policy linkages, share lessons from South Africa’s transitional justice journey and broader continental experiences, and identify opportunities for future collaboration in research, policy engagement, and youth development. The gathering also underscored IJR’s commitment to advancing justice, reconciliation, and inclusive governance, while positioning the organisation as a strategic contributor to global conversations on post-conflict reconstruction and democratic consolidation.

A key contribution by IJR was a plenary presentation and a series of breakout sessions led by Prof Tim Murithi, Senior Advisor at the IJR, drawing on insights from the IPI-IJR project,“African Perspectives on the Emerging Global Order.” The discussions explored African perspectives on global disorder and the transformation of the multilateral system, highlighting the relevance of African experiences to contemporary global challenges.

The exchanges generated rich conversations on opportunities for African institutions to support Ukrainian civil society and governmental resilience efforts. Participants reflected on shared experiences of advocating for geopolitical transformation, protecting democratic transitions, and promoting inclusive governance in periods of uncertainty and change. Discussions also highlighted the potential for collaborative research on reparations, displacement, and transitional justice, areas of growing importance in both African and Ukrainian contexts

Beyond knowledge-sharing, the Winter School served as a valuable networking platform. Participants engaged with representatives from Ukrainian universities, think tanks, and government agencies to explore avenues for future cooperation. These engagements focused on developing collaborative research initiatives, establishing exchange programmes for African and Ukrainian scholars, and convening future dialogues on innovative approaches to peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Looking ahead, several strategic opportunities emerged from the engagement. Among these is the development of a Ukraine-Southern Africa Knowledge Partnership, aimed at producing joint policy briefs, seminars, and practitioner toolkits on transitional justice. The School also highlighted the potential for a Youth Peace Innovation Fellowship, which would connect young leaders from Ukraine and Southern Africa to co-create digital peacebuilding tools, exchange community resilience strategies, and build long-term networks of solidarity.

Reflecting on the significance of the Winter School, Prof Murithi noted that the engagement demonstrated a strong appetite for cross-cultural learning and collaboration on peacebuilding and governance challenges. By fostering meaningful dialogue between Ukrainian and African practitioners and scholars, the initiative contributed to building bridges across regions and strengthening international cooperation on justice, reconciliation, and resilience.

Against this backdrop, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) and the African Union Network of Think-Tanks for Peace (AU NeTT4Peace) convened a Focus Group Discussion on the reform of the United Nations Security Council at Addis Ababa University, on 30 July 2026. Supported by the Global Challenges Foundation, the dialogue brought together diplomats, policy analysts, civil society actors and regional stakeholders to deliberate on Africa’s role in shaping the future of global governance and multilateral reform.

Opening remarks were delivered by Prof Tim Murithi of the IJR, alongside Ms Lettie Tembo, Acting Director of the African Peace and Security Programme and Head of the Tana Forum Secretariat of the African Union NeTT4Peace.

The discussion was framed by growing global calls for a more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient and accountable multilateral system. Participants reflected on the historical underrepresentation of Africa within the UN Security Council and considered pathways for addressing what has long been regarded as a historical injustice. The meeting also examined recommendations contained in the UN Pact for the Future, particularly Action Point 39, which calls for reform of international institutions to better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities and emphasises redressing Africa’s marginalisation as a priority.

A key focus of the dialogue was the Common African Position on UNSC reform, embodied in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, as well as the African Union’s February 2026 decision outlining the African Union Model for the Inter-Governmental Negotiations process. Participants debated whether current reform proposals adequately address the evolving geopolitical environment and considered strategies for ensuring Africa’s interests are effectively represented in future negotiations.

Discussion sessions explored a range of issues, including the future of the veto power, the role of permanent African representation on the Security Council, and the need for a multilateral system grounded in justice, equity, human rights, and civilian protection. Participants also examined how the African Union could strengthen continental unity in selecting future African representatives and whether additional political, legal or performance-based criteria should guide representation at the Council.

The forum further considered whether Africa should explore innovative avenues for advancing its reform agenda, including the possibility of mobilising member states to invoke Article 109 of the UN Charter to convene a General Conference for Charter Review. Participants reflected on how the African Union could reassess and reposition its strategy in light of the continued limitations of the Security Council and broader shifts in the global order.

The initiative aimed to enhance knowledge and understanding of the African Union Model and the Common African Position among diplomats and policymakers, while strengthening the capacity of AU member states, regional economic communities, civil society actors and policy experts to engage more effectively in the reform process.

The organisers noted that the outcomes of the discussion are expected to contribute to policy reflections among African Union member states, support more informed decision-making on Security Council reform, and identify strategic approaches for engaging in the Inter-Governmental Negotiations process. The forum also seeks to strengthen networks of diplomatic champions and stakeholders advocating for Africa’s meaningful representation within global governance structures.

As Africa continues to navigate complex peace, security, governance and development challenges, participants underscored the importance of revitalising multilateral institutions and ensuring the continent plays a central role in shaping the future of global governance. The IJR-IPSS Focus Group Discussion represents an important step in advancing dialogue and consensus-building around Africa’s aspirations for a more equitable and representative United Nations Security Council.

These are not criminals. These are human beings — refugees and asylum seekers — who sought the protection of the South African Police Service in KZN, after being unlawfully displaced and violently targeted by vigilante formations and anti-migrant groups. Instead of receiving protection, dignity, and lawful assistance, they were subjected to public humiliation, intimidation, force, and the denial of their most basic constitutional rights.

With local government elections on the horizon, it is deeply alarming to witness public representatives intentionally fueling anti-migrant hostility. We condemn the ruthless exploitation of marginalised migrants for political leverage. Rather than taking accountability for deep-seated governance and economic shortcomings, leaders across the political spectrum are actively scapegoating migrants. Profound national crises—including massive unemployment, collapsing infrastructure, and under-resourced public services—are being dangerously oversimplified into false and inflammatory claims that predominantly Black African non-citizens are the cause of local hardship.

South Africa’s Constitution, born from the struggles against apartheid oppression, enshrines the rights to dignity, equality, freedom and security of the person, access to legal representation, and protection from arbitrary and degrading treatment.  All of which were denied to black people in South Africa under apartheid. Today, it cannot be that these rights are reserved only for citizens. They apply to all who live within our borders.

To deny refugees and asylum seekers access to legal representation, to remove them through coercion and fear, and to subject them to treatment that echoes the brutality of the apartheid regime, is an affront to the very values for which generations of Black South Africans fought and died.

We categorically reject:

• The growing normalisation of xenophobia, scapegoating, and mob rule in our society.
• The criminalisation of African migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.
• The complicity and silence of state institutions when vigilante groups unlawfully and violently evict people from homes, workplaces, and spaces of livelihood with impunity.
• The political campaigns built on the dangerous and unconstitutional premise of ‘othering’ vulnerable populations.

What we are witnessing is the public erosion of constitutional democracy. The rule of law is only applied to the rich and privileged, and this is unconstitutional. At a time when South Africa should stand as a beacon of human rights and Pan-African solidarity, fellow Africans are being treated with cruelty, hostility, and barbarism while seeking refuge and protection. This is structural and institutionalised xenophobia.

This Africa Day, we call on the whole of society to publicly denounce these acts, challenge harmful narratives, and stand in solidarity with humanity.  We call on:

• Politicians and political parties to immediately cease using xenophobic rhetoric as an electoral tool and commit to fact-based, responsible campaigning.
• The Media and Journalists to promote responsible, fact-based, rights-based public discourse and avoid amplifying divisive and unsubstantiated claims.
• Civil society organisations, faith-based institutions, and trade unions to continue the vital work of peacebuilding and community solidarity.
• Legal practitioners, human rights defenders, and social movements to remain vigilant in holding the state accountable to the Constitution.

We further demand:

1. An immediate end to the use of force, coercion and intimidation against refugees and asylum seekers by state and non-state actors;
2. Full accountability and independent investigations into any unlawful conduct or abuses committed by law enforcement officials;
3. Immediate and decisive action against vigilante groups engaged in unlawful evictions, intimidation, and xenophobic violence;
4. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to strictly monitor and enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, heavily penalising parties that incite violence or hatred against migrants.
5. The reaffirmation by the South African government of its constitutional and international obligations toward refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants.
6. The full and urgent implementation of the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and all relevant stakeholders, including the establishment of effective monitoring, early warning, and rapid response mechanisms.

Today, as we mark Africa Day, we are called to reflect on the true spirit of Pan-African unity and liberation. We cannot authentically celebrate our shared continental identity while simultaneously tearing down and brutalising our fellow Africans. We must stand united, rejecting the artificial divisions sown by xenophobia, and reaffirm our commitment to a continent where the dignity of every person is fiercely protected.

History will judge us not by our silence, but by whether we defended the humanity of the most vulnerable among us.

An injury to one is an injury to all.

Zabalaza Pathways Institute

…catalysing people’s power for just, loving societies, without poverty…

[Organisation / Individual Name]

1. Lawyers for Human Rights
2. Union Against Hunger
3. Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia
4. Consortium for Refugees and migrants in South Africa
5. Southern Africa Litigation Centre
6. Wits Law Clinic
7. The International Labour Research and Information Group (ILRIG)
8. Dr Dale McKinley
9. Africa Grassroots Healing Initiatives
10. Centre for Applied Legal Studies
11. Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town
12. Zabalaza Pathways Institute…catalysing people’s power for just, loving societies, without poverty…
13. Ntirhisano Community Centre (NCC)
14. GroundWork, Friends of the Earth South Africa
15. Right2Protest
16. The Fruit Basket
17. Media Review Network
18. Africa Unite
19. Afesis
20. Be True to Me
21. The Auwal Socio-economic Research Institute (ASRI)
22. Treatment Action Campaign -TAC
23. Section 27
24. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
25. Zabalaza for Socialism
26. Free Basotho Movement
27. Collective Voices for Health Access
28. Legal Resources Centre
29. Amnesty International
30. The Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA)
31. South African Red Cross Society
32. Socio Economic Rights Institute
33. Tabitha Paine
34. Congolese Civil Society of South Africa
35. African Solidarity Campaign
36. Palestinian Solidarity Campaign (PSC)
37. United Front

Introduction

South Africa occupies a distinctive and paradoxical position in contemporary African political history. On one hand, its negotiated transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy in 1994 is widely regarded as one of the most significant political achievements of the twentieth century. This serves as a testament to the capacity of deeply divided societies to transcend institutionalised violence and construct inclusive democratic frameworks grounded in universal human dignity. On the other hand, the post-apartheid period has been marked by recurring episodes of xenophobic violence that expose deep fractures within the country’s social fabric and raise fundamental questions about the sustainability and depth of its reconciliation project.[1] That a society which experienced, and ultimately rejected, one of the most systematically dehumanising regimes in modern history should generate among the highest rates of xenophobic violence on the African continent is not merely a social anomaly. It is a moral and political contradiction that demands serious scholarly and civic interrogation.[2]

Xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa represents not simply a manifestation of socioeconomic frustration or inadequate immigration governance, but a fundamental threat to the normative foundations upon which the democratic order was constructed. Beyond its immediate humanitarian consequences, xenophobia carries profound strategic, diplomatic, and economic implications for South Africa’s democratic future and continental standing. Addressing it credibly requires sustained engagement with the unfinished work of reconciliation, historical memory, and the ethical responsibilities embedded within the country’s liberation history.

The Architecture of Apartheid Dehumanisation

To understand the moral weight of xenophobia in the South African context, it is necessary to engage seriously with the nature of the apartheid system it implicitly mirrors. Apartheid was not merely a regime of racial segregation or economic exploitation, though it was certainly both. At its ideological core, apartheid was a systematic project of dehumanisation the construction and legal enforcement of a social order premised on the fundamental inequality of persons. Through the Population Registration Act of 1950, the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Bantu Education Act of 1953, and the pass law system codified in the Natives Act of 1952, the apartheid state institutionalised the classification of human beings as inherently unequal, assigning differential rights, resources, and degrees of belonging based on racially determined categories.[3]

The effect of this system was not only material deprivation, though its material consequences were severe and enduring. Its deeper effect was the assault on the personhood of the majority of South Africa’s citizens, the systematic denial of dignity, agency, and the right to self-determination. Scholars of transitional justice have emphasised that the primary injury of apartheid extended beyond economic dispossession to encompass what Mahmood Mamdani has described as the political production of the subject[4]: the process by which entire populations were constituted as permanent outsiders within their own homeland, stripped of the civic standing that full membership of a political community requires.[5]

It is against this historical backdrop that violence directed at foreign nationals in contemporary South Africa must be evaluated. The structural logic animating xenophobic attacks, the identification of a nationalised other as an illegitimate occupant of space and a competitor for resources reproduces in a different register, the logic that sustained apartheid. The claim that foreign nationals do not belong here, that they are taking what rightfully belongs to others, and that their presence constitutes a threat to the legitimate community is structurally analogous to the apartheid-era claim that Black South Africans were alien to the spaces from which they were forcibly removed. The moral architecture is identical, even when the language and the perpetrators differ.

Socioeconomic Grievance and the Politics of Scapegoating

It would be analytically insufficient to dismiss xenophobic violence as simply the product of moral failure or cultural intolerance without engaging seriously with its socioeconomic conditions. South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.63 according to the most recent World Bank measurement, placing it consistently among the three most unequal countries globally.[6] Unemployment, measured by the expanded definition that includes discouraged work-seekers, exceeds forty percent of the working-age population.[7] Access to quality public education, healthcare, and basic services remains deeply unequal along spatial and racial lines that closely reproduce the geography of apartheid.[8]

These material conditions create environments in which scapegoating can flourish. When communities are economically marginalised and politically abandoned, the displacement of grievance onto a proximate and relatively powerless other becomes a politically available response to suffering that is, in reality, structurally produced. This dynamic is well documented in scholarship on nationalism and inter-group violence.[9] What is unique to South Africa, however, is the particular moral and historical context in which it occurs, and the specific obligations that context creates.

It must be stated with clarity that foreign nationals residing in South Africa are not the architects of its structural inequalities. The governance failures, institutional weaknesses, and policy shortcomings that have produced persistent unemployment, inadequate service delivery, and growing social frustration are the product of decisions made by South African citizens in positions of political authority. Research by the South African Reconciliation Barometer has consistently demonstrated that declining public trust in state institutions correlates directly with increased inter-group hostility and scapegoating behaviour, a finding that underscores the relationship between governance failure and social violence.[10]

To then redirect legitimate political grievance away from those who hold power and toward those who do not is not merely analytically incorrect. It is, historically and morally, a familiar form of political manipulation that serves the interests of the powerful by ensuring that accountability is never fully demanded of them.

The Obligations of Liberation History and Continental Solidarity

South Africa’s particular historical position within the African continent creates obligations that its contemporary democratic practice cannot responsibly ignore. The achievement of liberation from apartheid was not the accomplishment of South Africans alone. It was made possible, in significant measure, by the solidarity of neighbouring African states that bore considerable economic and political costs in support of the liberation struggle. Zambia hosted the African National Congress in exile for decades. Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, and Lesotho provided training facilities, safe passage, and material support to freedom fighters whom the apartheid government sought to capture, imprison, or kill.[11]

This history constitutes a form of political and moral obligation that shapes the ethical responsibilities of post-apartheid South Africa toward the broader African community. When citizens of the very nations that sheltered South Africa’s liberation movement are subjected to violence, displacement, and dehumanisation on South African soil, the contradiction between the country’s liberation history and its contemporary social practice becomes acute and cannot be diplomatically or morally papered over.

Reconciliation as an Ongoing Democratic Obligation

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation has consistently argued, across more than two decades of research and civic engagement, that reconciliation must be understood not as a discrete historical event but as a continuous social and political process. The formal architecture of South Africa’s transition the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Interim and Final Constitutions, the early institutional reforms of the democratic period  created the conditions for reconciliation but did not complete it.[12]

The persistence of xenophobia represents a significant failure within this ongoing process. It signals that the normative commitments embedded in South Africa’s constitutional order  commitments to human dignity, equality, and the inherent worth of every person  have not been sufficiently translated into the social values and everyday practices of significant portions of the population. Research demonstrates that societies characterised by high levels of social trust and inclusive civic identity are better positioned to achieve sustainable economic development, effective public services, and democratic stability.[13]

The erosion of social trust produced by xenophobic violence is therefore not simply a humanitarian concern. It is a threat to the long-term developmental and democratic viability of the South African state and it demands a response that is simultaneously structural, political, and moral.

Why South Africa Cannot Afford to be Perceived as Xenophobic

Beyond the moral and historical arguments, South Africa faces concrete and quantifiable strategic costs from being perceived as a xenophobic state. These costs manifest across diplomatic, economic, and reputational dimensions that directly undermine the country’s national interests and its ambitions as a continental leader.

Economically, South Africa is the most industrialised economy on the continent and has historically positioned itself as the primary gateway for foreign direct investment into sub-Saharan Africa. According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report, South Africa attracted $9 billion in FDI inflows in 2023, a figure that is acutely sensitive to perceptions of political stability, social cohesion, and institutional reliability.[14] Recurring episodes of xenophobic violence generate international media coverage that presents the country as unstable and socially fractured, directly undermining investor confidence and tourism attractiveness. South Africa’s tourism sector, which contributed approximately R425 billion to the economy in 2023, is particularly vulnerable to reputational damage of this nature.[15]

Diplomatically, South Africa’s ability to exercise continental leadership through the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, and in forums such as the African Continental Free Trade Area negotiations depends fundamentally on the goodwill and political trust of its regional partners.[16] Xenophobic attacks on nationals from SADC member states have repeatedly strained bilateral relationships and provoked formal diplomatic protests, travel advisories, and in some instances retaliatory economic responses from affected countries.[17]

The AfCFTA, which envisions a single market of 54 countries with a combined GDP of $3.4 trillion and a population of 1.3 billion people, represents the single most significant economic opportunity available to South Africa over the coming decades.[18] However, the realisation of this opportunity requires the deep trust, stable cross-border relationships, and political goodwill of regional partners. Xenophobia corrodes precisely the social and diplomatic capital that makes economic integration viable. Countries whose nationals are attacked on South African soil are not inclined to extend preferential market access or collaborative trade frameworks to the aggressor.

South Africa also carries specific obligations under international and domestic law that make a posture of tolerance toward xenophobia legally untenable. Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa guarantees the right to dignity for ‘everyone’, a formulation that extends constitutional protection explicitly to non-citizens.[19] The Refugees Act 130 of 1998[20] and South Africa’s obligations under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees[21] and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention further impose non-refoulement and non-discrimination obligations that xenophobic violence systematically violates.[22]

There is, furthermore, a significant human capital dimension to this question. Africa’s most skilled and mobile professionals, the doctors, engineers, academics, and entrepreneurs whose contributions are essential to the continent’s development observe South Africa’s social climate carefully in making decisions about where to live, invest, and build. A country perceived as hostile to foreign Africans will not attract the intra-African talent and investment it requires to sustain its own developmental trajectory.[23]

In short, xenophobia is not merely a moral failure. It is a strategic liability that costs South Africa in investor confidence, tourist arrivals, diplomatic standing, regional trade relationships, and human capital attraction. The perception of xenophobia, once established internationally, is extraordinarily difficult to reverse and imposes costs that accumulate over years and decades. A country that aspires to continental leadership and positions itself as the institutional home of African integration cannot simultaneously be the continent’s most visible site of anti-African violence.

Conclusion: The Unfinished Work of Democratic Belonging

South Africa’s constitutional democracy was founded on a moral claim of universal human dignity the insistence that no person’s humanity is conditional upon their race, their classification, or their national origin. That claim was forged in the experience of a people who knew, with terrible intimacy, what it meant to have their humanity denied by law and by force. It was given institutional expression in a Constitution that guarantees the rights to equality and dignity not to citizens alone, but to ‘everyone’. This was a deliberate and morally significant choice of language.

Xenophobia is an assault on that foundational claim. It reproduces, in new form, the logic of exclusion that generations of South Africans sacrificed to overcome. It does not solve unemployment. It does not repair public services. It does not build a single school, house a single family, or create a single sustainable livelihood. What it does is deepen social fracture, corrode democratic trust, dishonour the solidarity of those who supported South Africa’s liberation, expose the country to strategic and diplomatic costs it cannot afford, and betray the moral authority that its democratic transition gave to the world.

The response to the conditions that produce xenophobic violence must be structural, political, and sustained. It must involve genuine accountability for governance failures, meaningful investment in public services and employment creation, and the political courage to name the actual causes of inequality rather than permitting the convenient displacement of grievance onto the most vulnerable. Alongside this, the work of reconciliation, the patient, difficult, and ongoing work of building a society that affirms the dignity of all who live within it  must be deepened and expanded, not treated as a historical achievement already secured. South Africa has the moral and constitutional foundations for such a society. The question confronting it, urgently and without the luxury of indefinite deferral, is whether it possesses the collective will to build it.

– Elijah Masubelele is the Deputy Executive Director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, where he provides strategic leadership in advancing transitional justice, social cohesion, and inclusive governance across Africa.

REFERENCES

1. African Union Commission. (2020). Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at: https://au.int/en/cfta
2. Ellis, S. (2012). External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990. London: Hurst & Company.
3. Gobodo-Madikizela, P. (2003). A Human Being Died That Night: A South African Woman Confronts the Legacy of Apartheid. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
4. Human Rights Watch. (2009). Hate on the Streets: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. New York: Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/21/hate-streets/xenophobic-violence-south-africa
5. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. (2025). South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey Report. Cape Town: IJR. Available at: https://www.ijr.org.za/reconciliation-barometer
6. Landau, L. B. (ed.). (2011). Exorcising the Demon Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
7. Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Mamdani, M. (2001). Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4), 651–664.
9. Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Republic of South Africa. 1950. Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. Pretoria: Government Printer.
11. Republic of South Africa. 1950. Population Registration Act 30 of 1950. Pretoria: Government Printer.
12. Republic of South Africa. 1952. Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952. Pretoria: Government Printer.
13. Republic of South Africa. 1953. Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953. Pretoria: Government Printer.
14. Seekings, J. & Nattrass, N. (2015). Policy, Politics and Poverty in South Africa. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
15. South Africa (1998) Refugees Act 130 of 1998. Pretoria: Government Printer.
16. South Africa Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (2026) South Africa’s response to the request by the Republic of Ghana for a debate at the AU on xenophobic attacks. Available at: https://dirco.gov.za/
17. South African Tourism. (2023). Annual Tourism Report 2023. Pretoria: South African Tourism. Available at: https://www.southafrica.net/research-and-insights
18. Statistics South Africa. (2024). Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 4, 2023. Pretoria: Stats SA. Available at: http://www.statssa.gov.za
19. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. (1998). Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Vols. 1–5). Cape Town: Juta & Co.
20. (2024). World Investment Report 2024: Investment Facilitation for Development. Geneva: United Nations. Available at: https://unctad.org/wir
21. United Nations (1951) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, entered into force 22 April 1954.
22. World Bank. (2023). Gini Index — South Africa. World Bank Development Research Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ZA

FOOTNOTES

[1] Human Rights Watch. (2009). Hate on the Streets: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. New York: Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/21/hate-streets/xenophobic-violence-south-africa

[2] Landau, L. B. (ed.). (2011). Exorcising the Demon Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

[3] Republic of South Africa, Population Registration Act 30 of 1950; Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953; Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952; see also Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 1 (Cape Town: Juta, 1998).

[4] Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[5] Mamdani, M. (2001). Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4), 651–664.

[6] World Bank. (2023). Gini Index — South Africa. World Bank Development Research Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ZA

[7] Statistics South Africa. (2024). Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 4, 2023. Pretoria: Stats SA. Available at: http://www.statssa.gov.za

[8] International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2026) Spatial Inequality in South Africa: Causes and Policy Options. IMF Selected Issues Paper No. 2026/018. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Available at: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/selected-issues-papers/2026/english/sipea2026018.pdf

[9] Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[10] Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. (2023). South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey Report. Cape Town: IJR. Available at: https://www.ijr.org.za/reconciliation-barometer.

[11] Ellis, S. (2012). External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990. London: Hurst & Company.

[12] Adonis, C.K. (2025) “The crown without the jewels: South Africa’s flawed transition and its implications for social justice and equity in post-apartheid South Africa”, Critical Discourse Studies, 18(6). https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980251368766

[13] OECD (2018) Trust and social capital, in For Good Measure: Advancing Research on Well-being, Metrics Beyond GDP. Paris: OECD Publishing.

[14] UNCTAD. (2024). World Investment Report 2024: Investment Facilitation for Development. Geneva: United Nations. Available at: https://unctad.org/wir

South African Tourism. (2023). Annual Tourism Report 2023. Pretoria: South African Tourism. Available at: https://www.southafrica.net/research-and-insights ^[15]

[16] African Union Commission. (2020). Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at: https://au.int/en/cfta

[17] South Africa Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (2026) South Africa’s response to the request by the Republic of Ghana for a debate at the AU on xenophobic attacks. Available at: https://dirco.gov.za/

[18] World Bank (2020) The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects. Washington, DC: World Bank

[19] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 10

[20] South Africa (1998) Refugees Act 130 of 1998. Pretoria: Government Printer.

[21] United Nations (1951) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, entered into force 22 April 1954.

[22] Organisation of African Unity (1969) OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted 10 September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974.

[23] UNCTAD (2024)

Dates: 4–6 August 2026
Venue: Western Cape, South Africa

More information: https://www.uaza.co.za/facilitating-cooperation/ukrainian-african-academic-winter-school/

The Winter School is an in-person event that aims to bring Southern African and Ukrainian academics together to engage in discussions on topics of common interest and to build a network of individuals interested in cooperation and in promoting further connections between Ukrainian and South African academics.

The primary participants are academics and think-tank researchers who collaborate with Ukrainian academics or think tanks, as well as those researching topics related to Ukraine or interested in introducing Ukraine-related case studies into their teaching. PhD students whose research is linked to Ukraine are also encouraged to apply.

During the Winter School, participants will engage in workshops and discussions that bridge cultural, historical, and security perspectives to support long-term dialogue. The Winter School is structured around three simultaneous streams:

• Ukraine and Southern African Futures in the Current World Disorder (for International Relations, Politics, and Security Studies researchers)
• Understanding the Past for a Better Future (History, Art, Decolonial Studies, and related fields)
• Human Rights, Accountability, and Democracy (Human Rights and International Law)

In addition to lectures and discussions, the programme will include practical workshops on Ukrainian culture, language, and understanding academic life during the war.

We would appreciate it if you could RSVP by 1 June 2026.

Registration Form

If you have additional questions or would like to receive more information please reach out info@uaza.co.za

As South Africa marks 30 years since TRC started its work is an important moment for us to reflect on the legacy of the TRC and the work that still needs to be done.  This anniversary is both a reminder and a time for reflection—highlighting the successes as well as the gaps in justice, reparations, accountability, and social healing that continue into the present. For the IJR, this anniversary reaffirms its mandate to deepen reconciliation by addressing structural inequality, strengthening the rule of law, and fostering inclusive dialogue, particularly for generations who continue to live with the unresolved consequences of the past.

The conference gave IJR an opportunity to participate in a discussion on “Reconciliation for whom?” Dr Fanie du Toit, IJR’s Interim Executive Director, reflected on the way in which the TRC was a disruption from the past: it effectively created a disjuncture from the narrative of the apartheid state and laid bare what it had long tried to bury.  The Khulumani Galela Campaign, represented by Nomarussia Bonase, noted that reconciliation is still a pipe-dream for many of the survivors, victims and their families who have not received reparations.

The event highlighted the way in which the TRC created a shared, indisputable history: 82% of South Africans believe that apartheid was a crime against humanity, which includes 65% of white people who acknowledge this (SA Reconciliation Barometer, 2025).  This is significant as for there to be reconciliation, there has to be acknowledgement of the harm that was done.  The picture painted by the TRC was able to disrupt the apartheid narratives propagated by the State.

One of the important defining features of the TRC was the way in which it centred victims.  In the preamble to the TRC Act, it states that the purpose of the act is to afford “victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of, victims of violations of human rights; reporting to the Nation about such violations and victims; the making of recommendations aimed at the prevention of the commission of gross violations of human rights”. The stated intention of the Act and the TRC process was to centre the experience of victims and to humanize them through giving them the opportunity to share their stories, which had been (violently) silenced in the past.  The process also gave an opportunity for the families of victims to find out what had happened to their loved ones who were disappeared and murdered.

The TRC also broke with the past in creating institutional transparency, naming names of perpetrators thereby dismantling the culture of secrecy and denial which had characterized the apartheid regime.

The event also recognised the way in which the TRC in South Africa has been used as the model for many transitional justice processes in post-conflict countries.  To this end, it invited participants from Kenya, the Gambia, Colombia, Uganda, South Sudan, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Tunisia, Taiwan and South Korea.

The convening highlighted some of the shortcomings of the lack of implementation and follow-up on the TRC and its processes.  The failure to prosecute those who were denied amnesty is one of the most glaring examples.  More than that, the political interference which actively aimed at preventing prosecution – which is the subject of the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry – has had serious consequences.  First and foremost, it has delayed justice for the families of the victims of apartheid.  Secondly, it has damaged our national pursuit of the rule of law and accountability which has led to a culture of impunity, which goes beyond this issue into the larger arena of state capture.

While the TRC was limited to political acts, criticism has been laid that a glaring gap in our transitional justice process has been the lack of accountability for economic apartheid and the larger crimes associated with colonialism.  Issues of economic accountability and the land question remain unresolved.  According to SARB 2025, the majority of South Africans believe that inequality is the greatest obstacle to reconciliation, indicating the necessity for these issues to be addressed and resolved.

The focus on individual acts has led to a blind-spot in terms of the structural violence metered out by apartheid.  The institutional nature of the system which was ubiquitous and imbedded in every aspect of society has yet to be properly examined.  This, it can be argued, is one of the reasons for the persistent racism which still remains.

The conference examined the issue of gender.  One of the critiques of the process has been that it failed to recognise the unique and gendered nature of the experience of women.  In many instances, the women who appeared before the committee were doing so to tell the stories of their fathers, uncles, brothers, husbands and sons. Not enough attention was paid to the particular experience of women under apartheid, especially as it related to sexual violence – which was seen as beyond the scope of the TRC.

One of the greatest failures of the last 30 years has been the failure to implement the recommendations of the TRC on the issue of reparations.  The government’s alarming decision not to follow the recommendations regarding compensation and limiting reparations to only those who appeared before the TRC is a blight on our democracy.  That the President’s Fund is sitting with R2 billion, while survives continue to live (and die) in poverty, is inexcusable.

The picture that emerges of the TRC and its legacy is mixed: there are two competing legacies which co-exist at once.  There is the positive legacy which has laid the foundations for the values and principles of the Constitution to be lived out, while simultaneously the failures have led to the persistent problems we experience today.  As we go forward, we would do well to remember the words of the Final Report: “Reconciliation is a long haul and depends not on a commission for its achievement but on all of us making our contribution.”

The engagement offered students an in‑depth introduction to transitional justice in South Africa, highlighting both the achievements and the enduring shortcomings of the post‑apartheid transition.

IJR’s Senior Practitioner, Felicity Harrison and Prof Tim Murithi, Senior Advisor, engaged with the students, expounding on the work of the IJR in South Africa and across the continent, acknowledging that justice and reconciliation are ongoing processes.

“IJR was born out of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, recognising that justice and reconciliation are ongoing processes,” Harrison explained, further expounding on the work of the organisation that has since expanded from South Africa across Africa, focusing on post-colonial transitions and conflicts, and the mutual exchange of lessons between South Africa and other countries.

Discussions explored some of the most pressing unresolved issues in South Africa today, including apartheid denial, the failure to fully implement reparations, and ongoing efforts to reopen apartheid‑era inquests into the deaths of political activists. Particular attention was given to the frustration of survivors and families who continue to face delayed justice due to missing evidence, legal obstruction, and a lack of political will.

The visit also addressed broader challenges of public trust, corruption, and institutional legitimacy, as well as the limits of legal frameworks without effective enforcement. From a global perspective, conversations extended to international law, reparations for historical injustice, and South Africa’s role in activating international legal mechanisms.

For the visiting Erasmus law students, the exchange underscored the reality that law operates within political and social constraints. The visit reinforced IJR’s belief that justice must be victim‑centred, participatory, and ongoing, grounded not only in legal processes but also in community engagement, historical truth‑telling, and institutional transformation.

Call for abstracts for a research workshop to be convened at the Centre for African Studies (CAS), University of Cape Town, South Africa on Thursday 4th June 2026, 9.30am – 3.30pm.

Towards a pan-African reparations agenda: Contestations, disputations and prospects

The global resurgence of calls for reparative justice animated by the Pan-African and global African reparations movement, the campaigns for restitution of African knowledge and cultural artefacts, the Black Lives Matter movement and the growing momentum for the decolonisation of knowledge, has reignited debates on reparations for historical injustices, particularly those rooted in slavery, colonialism, apartheid and systemic racial oppression. Across the African continent and its global diaspora, notably in the Americas and the Caribbean, the demand for reparations has evolved from moral appeals to structured political, legal, and economic claims.

This research workshop provides an academic platform to interrogate the contestations, disputations as well as the prospects for a Pan-African and global African reparations agenda.

In Africa, the Caribbean, the Americas and Europe, the reparations discourse is increasingly framed within continuing struggles to redress historical injustices as well as to decolonise the Pan-African body politic and assert continental political and economic sovereignty through redistributive socio-economic justice. Yet, the agenda remains fragmented, contested, and often co-opted by competing interests. While some African and Caribbean governments, for example the CARICOM Community, and civil society actors have advanced bold claims, others remain hesitant or divided on the modalities, beneficiaries, and political implications of reparations. The African Union’s designation of 2026–2036 as the Decade of Justice for Africans and People of African Descent and the growing influence of Pan-African and global African advocacy networks signal a critical moment to consolidate scholarly research as well as policy and activist perspectives.

This workshop, convened by the University of Cape Town (UCT) Centre for African Studies (CAS), Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), and UCT Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa (IDCPPA), seeks to interrogate the evolving contours of the Pan-African reparations agenda. It aims to provide a platform for rigorous academic engagement and strategic reflection on the prospects and pitfalls of reparative justice in Africa and its global diasporas.

The one-day workshop offers an opportunity for scholars, advanced postgraduate students, artists, jurists, and activists to share their perspectives on topics such as:

• Moral, political and legal pathways and precedents for reparations;
• Cultural restitution and memory politics;
• Reparations and economic justice in Africa and Global Africa;
• Gendered dimensions of historical injustice and repair;
• Youth, digital activism, and the future of reparations;
• Key recommendations to policymakers, including the African Union and CARICOM Community and civil society leaders;
• Artistic interventions, including exhibitions, performances, and film screenings exploring reparative memory and resistance;
• Graduate student presentations to showcase emerging scholarship and foster mentorship;
• Establishment of a UCT Pan-African Reparations Research Working Group to further refine academic papers to be featured in a special journal issue or edited volume.

Expected outcomes

The Research Conference will seek to establish:

• A consolidated body of interdisciplinary research scholarship on reparations in Africa and the Global African Diaspora;
• A policy brief outlining key recommendations for African governments, regional bodies, and international partners;
• Strengthened research networks among scholars, activists, and institutions engaged in reparative justice;
• Enhanced public awareness and engagement through media coverage and cultural programmes;
• A roadmap for future collaborative research, advocacy, and policy engagement on reparations.

About the co-convenors

Centre for African Studies (CAS), University of Cape Town: CAS is a leading interdisciplinary hub for critical scholarship on Africa and for advancing African perspectives on global predicaments. It fosters interdisciplinary research, teaching and public engagement on the continent’s past, present, and futures.

Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR): IJR works across Africa to promote reparative justice, transitional justice, reconciliation and inclusive development. It engages governments, civil society and communities in building democratic societies rooted in human rights, redress, accountability and dignity.

Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa (IDCPPA), University of Cape Town: IDCPPA advances research and dialogue on the challenges and possibilities of democratic governance in Africa. It brings together scholars and practitioners to explore issues of citizenship, accountability and public policy from a Pan-African perspective.

Co-Convenors: 

• Prof. Suren Pillay, Director: UCT Centre for African Studies (CAS)
• Prof. Tim Murithi, Research Associate: UCT Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IDCPPA)

Submissions

Participants are requested to submit a research paper abstract of no more than 500 words by Thursday, 30th April 2026, including name, affiliation and email address via email to: cas@uct.ac.za.

The workshop selection committee will notify successful participants by 15th May 2026.

NB: Note that, due to limited resources, all participants outside Cape Town will be expected to cover their own travel and accommodation costs to attend.