



## ZIMBABWE

### Executive Summary

The crisis facing Zimbabwe today is rooted in the colonial period beginning in 1890. Africans were driven from the land and resettled in designated "reserves", leading to the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893 and the destruction of the Ndebele monarchy. In 1895 the territory was formally named Rhodesia and placed under the British South Africa Company's (BSAC) administration, which institutionalised a system of land distribution based on race that lies at the root of land conflict in Zimbabwe today.

Having joined the Central African Federation, the settlers chose not to follow Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the granting of universal suffrage which led to the establishment of the independent countries of Zambia and Malawi. Racial attitudes hardened. The white Rhodesia Front (RF) won all 50 parliamentary seats and subsequently implemented a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom based on white domination.

This led to international economic sanctions and a full-scale bush war waged by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under the banner of the Patriotic Front (PF). Experiencing increased pressure from the international community to reach a political settlement and facing the consequences of a bitter civil war, the Rhodesian government established an alliance with compliant African leaders 'in the then Rhodesia/ under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1978. This intensified the war efforts of the PF. Under the auspices of the British government there was an eventual suspension of hostilities, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed and Robert Mugabe was elected Prime Minister (and later President) of an independent Zimbabwe in 1980. Soon after independence tensions emerged between ZAPU and ZANU resulting in the Matabeleland Massacre and the eventual signing of an accord by Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, with ZANU to bring an end to the suffering of people in the Midlands and Matabeleland regions of the country. In 1988 this Unity Accord saw the birth of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and essentially made Zimbabwe a one party state.

Despite majority rule, the economy and ownership of land remained largely in the hands of whites. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, together with the required Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), resulted in the government being unable to meet the demands of the African majority. War veterans and others made increased demands for access to land and poverty relief as

economic pressures increased. Unable to risk the political consequences of this discontent Mugabe committed himself to meeting their demands for access to land. At the end of almost two decades of independence this commitment resulted in the invasion of white-owned farms, violence and further economic decline.

Opposition politics, leading to the founding of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was driven throughout this period by trade unions and civil society. It resulted in continual incremental defeats of ZANU-PF at the polls. With Mugabe continuing to resist political change, international pressure was intensified. A facilitation process was at the same time led by then South African President Thabo Mbeki under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This resulted in the establishment of an inclusive government that is tasked to rebuild the economy, re-establish structures of good governance, address issues of service delivery and promote nation building.

**Abbreviations**

BSAC	British South African Company
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
PF	Patriotic Front
RF	Rhodesia Front
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNAC	United African National Council
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDF	Zimbabwean Defence Force
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

## Introduction

The Zimbabwean crisis was to some extent abated with the signing of an agreement by the nation's opposing political parties on 15 September 2008. This opened the way for the formation of a transitional government, established in February 2009. This government, however, is faced with a ravaged economy, the near collapse of government infrastructure and public institutions.

Unemployment stood at an unprecedented 80% in 2007 and continued to decline with manufacturing and agriculture coming to a virtual standstill by the end of 2008. Ordinary citizens were unable to access basic food and commodities, resulting in the displacement and migration of millions of Zimbabweans to neighbouring Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Namibia, and further afield to the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and elsewhere.

Zimbabwe's deep economic decline was aggravated by the near-collapse of governance. Democracy indicators such as freedom of the media, freedom of association, free and fair elections and the rule of law indicated the emergence of a police state. This situation was further aggravated by intensified repressive legislation, structural violence and abusive behaviour by security forces, entrenching a culture of impunity throughout the country.

The international community responded to the Zimbabwean crisis with political censure and by imposing economic sanctions. Today the focal point of analysis both within Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the world is whether, having contributed to persuading the ruling party to negotiate a settlement with the country's opposition parties, the international community now needs to start providing investment and economic aid to rebuild this severely weakened African state.

## Colonialism

The geographical area that is today Zimbabwe was settled by indigenous Shona and Ndebele tribes, totalling approximately 700 000 people, when the area was colonised under the leadership of Cecil John Rhodes in 1890. Two years earlier Rhodes obtained a concession for mineral rights from local chiefs, enabling the British to proclaim a "sphere of influence" in the area. This resulted in a "pioneer column" entering the territory in 1890, comprising 196 settlers and 500 police. The British South African Company (BSAC) that led the occupation was joined by would-be miners who demanded grants of land, resulting in settlers occupying large tracts of land in return for an annual payment of £1 "quit rent" per farm. Others followed the first settlers and were given grants of 2 500 hectares for farming purposes under the Victoria agreement. This land grab resulted in a number of conflicts between settlers and locals, culminating in the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893 which led to the removal and eventual destruction of the Ndebele monarchy. In 1895, the territory was formally named Rhodesia, and placed under the BSAC's administration – an event that precipitated the first *Chimurenga* (war of liberation) of 1896-7, claiming 8 000 lives in 18 months. In its aftermath, the settlers created a colonial state, institutionalising a system of radicalised land distribution that still lies at the root of land conflict in Zimbabwe today.

In 1899, the colonial administration indicated that it would "... assign to the natives land sufficient for their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and suitable for agriculture and pastoral requirement". In reality the policy allowed the forcible resettling of defeated Africans in "reserves". By 1905 there were 60 Native Reserves covering 22% of the country. Nearly half of the African population lived in reserves, losing approximately 16 million hectares of their land to the settlers. By 1920, the Native Reserves covered an area of 8.7 million hectares, while the white farmers had access to an area of approximately 15 million hectares.

### **Rhodesian politics and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)**

Following the termination of the BSAC Charter in 1923, Southern Rhodesia's white settlers were given the choice of being incorporated into the Union of South Africa or becoming a separate entity within the British Empire. The settlers rejected incorporation, and Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed by the United Kingdom. It became a self-governing colony with its own legislature, civil service, armed forces and police.

The period 1935 to 1955 saw the forcible removal of 67 000 African families from their traditional lands into new Native Reserves to make way for white-owned farms. Many displaced, dispossessed Africans now became farm-workers, only to find that by living in farm compounds they had placed themselves outside the scope of traditional authorities for protection or redress. The outcome was largely an abuse of African farm-workers by settlers.

In September 1953, Southern Rhodesia joined the British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to form the Central African Federation. The Protectorate's efforts to pool resources and markets were an economic success, but they were opposed by the African population who feared they would not be able to achieve self-government within the federal structure dominated by white Southern Rhodesians. The Federation was eventually dissolved in 1963 and in 1964, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland gained independence and became Zambia and Malawi respectively. The white electorate in Southern Rhodesia, however, showed little willingness to accede to African demands for increased political participation. In 1963, the right-wing settler party, the Rhodesia Front (RF), took office. Basing its campaign on a platform of gaining independence from the United Kingdom, the RF, led by Prime Minister Ian Smith, secured an overwhelming victory in the 1965 elections (conducted on the basis of a white voters' role), winning all 50 of the parliamentary seats. On 11 November 1965, after lengthy and unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom.

During this time, the white minority government entrenched the system of land ownership, with white Rhodesians owning large tracts of arable land and black Rhodesians being relegated to small, overcrowded communal areas that were difficult to cultivate. The British government declared the UDI unconstitutional and illegal but opted not to use force to quell Rhodesian independence. Instead it imposed economic sanctions in 1966 that were supported by the United Nations Security Council.

Although sanctions were openly violated by South Africa and less openly by some other nations, by 1968 there was a broad imposition of a commercial embargo which led to the Rhodesian economy becoming self-sufficient in food production and many other basic needs. This move served to favour whites in economic terms through the introduction of protective laws, with the African population facing few options other than being servants or depending on subsistence farming. In addition to these protective economic laws, the Rhodesian government introduced other constitutional mechanisms to safeguard the privilege of the white minority, enabling them to counter any forms of resistance from Africans. The Land Tenure Act (protecting white ownership of land), the Law, Order and Maintenance Act and the Emergency Powers Act (imposing repressive security laws) were all set in place to permit the state to carry out violent reprisals with impunity.

### **Liberation struggle**

By the 1970s, a fully-fledged guerrilla war was under way. Led by ZANU and ZAPU, rural populations were co-opted into the struggle and encouraged to fight for land rights. As a result, peasant and subsistence farmers suffered the largest number of war casualties. For close to a decade these and other rural civilians were ruthlessly targeted by the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). Guerrilla fighters also attacked villagers in their quest for food, shelter and protection from the RSF. In the mid-seventies, as a result of political developments in neighbouring Mozambique and Angola, together with increased pressure by the South African government seeking to limit its involvement in the Rhodesian conflict, the Rhodesian government began to explore possibilities for a political settlement. At the same time the war intensified, spreading throughout the country. Many able-bodied young men and women were recruited from villages to fight with the guerrilla forces and white Rhodesians were conscripted into the Rhodesian armed forces. By the end of the war Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA/ZANU) fighters and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army fighters (ZIPRA/ZAPU) were fighting a common cause under the banner of the Patriotic Front (PF).

In an attempt to salvage his regime from the onslaught of liberation forces, Ian Smith signed an accord with three conservative African leaders in Rhodesia under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1978. The struggle for liberation was at the same time intensifying, with ever-increasing cost to the Rhodesian government and the white settler community. The result of the accord was various safeguards for the white population, with elections to be followed by the setting up of an interim government that would oversee the country's administration until a new constitution was developed. Muzorewa won these elections under the banner of his United African National Council (UANC) party and became the country's Prime Minister while the name of the country was changed to Zimbabwe Rhodesia. This arrangement was denounced by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU respectively, resulting in the escalation of the war.

In 1979 the liberation movements and the Zimbabwe Rhodesian government reached a settlement through the facilitation of British Governor, Lord Christopher Soames. The Lancaster House Agreement, as it was known, resulted in a cease-fire leading to a transitional period under British rule. The transition was to prepare for new elections and a new constitution, formalising the establishment of Zimbabwe as

an independent state. ZANU and ZAPU representatives vehemently opposed the terms of negotiation, while moderates, such as Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole (founding leader of ZANU) were more amenable to the proposals, especially to the concessions given to white farmers to remain on their land. The agreement made provision for the British government to provide funds for the new Zimbabwean government to purchase land from white landowners after a period of ten to fifteen years, on the “willing-buyer willing-seller” basis. The name of the country was changed to Zimbabwe, with the Smith regime’s constitution remaining largely intact. This safeguarded white representation in parliament and preserved white economic power, together with property rights and the effective monopoly in business and access to markets.

### **Independence**

At independence the incoming regime inherited a seemingly healthy and growing economy, though it was skewed in favour of the white minority and by and large remained this way. Some of the black middle class were able to take advantage of this situation, but the majority of the black population remained rural peasants or were employed as factory, farm and mine workers. There were, however, some changes that benefitted the majority: the country’s manufacturing industry expanded, agricultural production improved and the exports increased, leading a significant increase in foreign currency earnings and increased employment. In addition during the early 1980s and 1990s the Zimbabwean government was able to deliver social services to the majority of Zimbabweans previously excluded from such benefits. For the first time blacks had full access to education, health, employment and various other opportunities.

Though the post-independence economy performed well initially, a fall in foreign reserves forced the government to seek assistance from external sources. In March 1983, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted Zimbabwe a significant loan. This loan and others which followed during the remainder of the 1980s required Zimbabwe to adhere to a strict structural adjustment programme.

Soon after independence the majority ZANU party began to institute repressive measures against ZAPU, with the ZAPU leadership and ex-combatants being accused of treasonous acts and of plotting to overthrow the ruling ZANU government. The conflict came to a head with the use of the North Korean-trained “Fifth Brigade” to eliminate any threat to the regime, resulting in rural dwellers in Matabeleland and the West of the country becoming victims of abuse, torture, terror and politically-motivated killings and massacres. This resulted in widespread fear of the ruling regime, death and untold suffering among the population in the affected areas and the exile or jailing of senior ZAPU officials on treason charges. This period of violence and intimidation in Matabeleland and the Midlands, known as *Gukurahundi*, resulted in the deaths of almost 10 000 people while thousands more were victims of torture and intimidation. To this day many of the victims remain unaccounted for with scores having been buried in mass and unmarked graves. Eventually in 1987, Joshua Nkomo, then leader of ZAPU, opted to sign the Unity Accord with ZANU. This essentially led to the merger of the two parties into what is today known as the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The overall outcome of this merger

of the two parties into a *de facto* one-party state committed the country to a “Marxist-Leninist doctrine” which has guided much of ZANU-PF’s policy decisions.

This co-option of the biggest opposition movement served to consolidate ZANU’s power. Civil society movements, including students unions, labour unions, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and other associations were then absorbed into the ranks of the ruling regime. However, the economic difficulties that followed in the 1990s soon threatened the relationship between the state and non-state actors, giving rise to protest movements by workers and students unions as well as widespread civil society activism; the backdrop of the last decade’s struggle for democracy.

### **The crisis**

In the popular media and other forums, Zimbabwe’s crisis is often portrayed as being a crisis of governance attributed to the person of Robert Mugabe. In reality there are multiple crises that have intertwined to contribute to Zimbabwe’s status as a country taken to the brink of collapse.

Zimbabwe’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) brought untold hardship to the people. The deregulation of prices and foreign exchange affected the performance of manufacturing and exports and the cost of production increased drastically. This contributed to the Zimbabwe dollar losing close to 70% of its value in relation to the US dollar.

As the effects of the ESAP began to impact on the government’s ability to provide social services to the poor there was an escalation of economic hardship for the majority of the Zimbabwean people. Civil servants loyal to the state joined other citizens in protesting against the continuation of these policies through mass stay-aways, strikes and food riots, especially in Harare. A significant group to be affected by the economic hardships were war veterans and others engaged with the Patriotic Forces during the liberation struggle. The limited skills that they possessed meant that it was difficult to integrate them into the economy. After a series of events in which this group made numerous threats against the government, a decision was taken to give war veterans a once-off payment of ZW\$ 50 000 and a pension of ZWD 2 000 a month. This unilateral decision by the regime was made without consideration of budgetary implications, putting further strain on the national treasury. The ESAP did not allow for this unplanned spending, which resulted in a decision by the IMF to suspend further budgetary support if the government did not review the war veteran pensions. War veterans had in the meantime come to represent a strategic and influential grouping in Zimbabwean society and it was not in the political interests of Mugabe and his party to alienate this group any further. In 2001 Mugabe terminated the ESAP, which led to war veterans exerting increased pressure on the government.

During this time Zimbabwe committed approximately 11 000 Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) troops to fight in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The government of Laurent Kabila in the DRC was under attack from Rwandan and Ugandan forces fighting in support of rebel forces. Analysts speculate that several prominent Zimbabweans, including Robert Mugabe himself, stood to gain from various lucrative mining concessions in the DRC. These concessions were intended to bring benefit to the Zimbabwean population but this did not happen. In fact, it is estimated that between 1997 and 1999,

the first two years of Zimbabwe's involvement, the government spent over US\$ 200 million in the DRC with little or no financial return. What is clear is that the payouts to war veterans, interest of loans from the World Bank and the IMF, increased military spending in the DRC and increasing inflation led to a crash of the Zimbabwean dollar on what was called "black Friday" in November 1997. The economy has never recovered.

As war veterans and others experienced increasing economic exclusion, they intensified their demands for access to arable land. This gave rise to the ongoing saga of farm invasions, associated with violence, intimidation and fear, and prompted Mugabe to intensify land restitution and redistribution programmes. The removal of white commercial farmers resulted in a reduction of agricultural output and foreign currency earnings which exacerbated the economic decline. The country was simultaneously affected by severe drought, which further impacted on the economy and intensified the suffering of the poor.

Over the last decade Zimbabwe's economy has been in free-fall with far-reaching effects on the social and moral fabric of society. The West argued that Mugabe was to blame for bringing the country to its knees. He argued that their economic sanctions were to blame for the decline of the economy.

### **Opposition politics**

After ZAPU's absorption into ZANU and before the birth of the MDC, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) under the leadership of Edgar Tekere came close to being a significant threat to the state. The relationship between state and civil society had reached an all-time low. In the late 1990s strikes by public servants as well as food riots and other demonstrations organised by the ZCTU gave many Zimbabweans the opportunity to show their dissatisfaction with reform. The most affected groups were students, workers, black entrepreneurs and civil servants.

In 1997-8 the ZCTU resistance resulted in many students, urban workers and farm workers shifting allegiance away from ZANU-PF. In 1998-9 ZCTU and other civic organisations, in particular the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), organised a "Working People's Convention" in pursuit of "broad-based movement for change". This later gave birth to the new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

This season of protests drew widespread support for the union seeing it gain political legitimacy and was buoyed by the momentum of the NCA process. Six months before the scheduled parliamentary elections, the ZCTU launched a new political party, the MDC, headed by Morgan Tsvangirai, a former trade union leader. In addition the period of demonstrations realised the emergence of civil society activism that represented the voices of those who could not be heard by the state. The violence meted out by the state during the riots and ensuing elections was unprecedented. Various non-governmental organisations such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Crisis Coalition and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights were founded in order to document incidents of violence and to defend political activists and ordinary citizens from the repressive laws of the state. These networks continue to be at the forefront of such activities in Zimbabwe today.

Having successfully mobilised Zimbabweans against the ZANU-PF proposals in a constitutional referendum, the MDC gained in popularity and emerged as the largest and most successful opposition movement since ZAPU merged with ZANU-PF in 1987. The majority of the MDC's support has come from the urban centres with Tsvangirai emerging as an extremely popular leader. Elections in 2000, 2002 and 2005 all saw the MDC gaining in strength and becoming an ever-increasing threat to the ruling ZANU-PF. In 2005 the MDC was, however, wrecked with controversy and instability and this led to the formation of a smaller faction led by Arthur Mutambara and Welshman Ncube.

Political tensions within the country as a whole were at the same time intensifying and in 2007 the SADC initiated mediation talks amongst Zimbabwe's main political opponents – ZANU-PF, the larger MDC faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai, and the smaller MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara – in order to pave the way forward. Continued reports of worsening humanitarian conditions made it impossible for the international community to ignore what was happening in the country, while the influx of economic migrants and internally displaced people into neighbouring countries kept increasing. The talks led by then South African President Thabo Mbeki were stalled several times, but eventually resulted in a cautious political breakthrough that would begin to bring an end to the Zimbabwean crisis. Despite Mbeki's unpopular promotion of a policy of quiet diplomacy with the Mugabe government, he succeeded in persuading ZANU-PF to ease several repressive electoral laws which allowed the MDC access into formerly "no go" areas in the run-up to the March 2008 election. For the first time Zimbabweans were to vote for the President, national assembly representatives and local government officials in the same election.

Though the MDC had succeeded in penetrating traditionally Zanu-PF areas during their election campaign, Tsvangirai was unable to secure an outright majority of the presidential vote, although the party had secured a parliamentary majority. This required a run-off election – with the results only being announced months after the election had taken place. The landmark victory of Tsvangirai was then marred by widespread political violence in the time leading to the run-off election. The abduction, torture and incarceration of political and civil society activists abounded, casting fear and uncertainty over a population devastated by economic hardship.

In September of 2008, the three political leaders, Robert Mugabe (Zanu-PF), Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M) signed an agreement to enter into an inclusive government that would jointly oversee the governing of the country. Although this agreement was signed in 2008, a unity government was only formed in February 2009.

The urgent issues facing the government include stimulating local industry, settling the issues of land redistribution, providing capacity for new land owners/farmers, reviving food production and putting an end to the wholesale looting of national resources.

### **Transitional justice**

Any consideration of transition in Zimbabwe must take cognisance of its historical past: the pre-colonial period, colonisation, the brutal war of independence, the Matabeleland Massacre in the early 1980s,

and security sector brutality in the period preceding the elections in 2005 and 2008. The events of 2005 and 2008 indicate that the government continued to resort to carefully-designed acts of violence until forced to the negotiation table. In 2005 the government initiated “Operation Murambatsvina” (Operation Clean-up) in the urban centres. The operation was officially aimed at ridding the urban areas of illegal markets, slums and the dwellings that had sprung up in these places. It resulted in the displacement of people as well as the loss of private property. It was aimed essentially at communities where the MDC had majority support. The 2008 elections that saw the unprecedented defeat of ZANU-PF and Mugabe by the MDC and Tsvangirai were followed by a period of intense violence against MDC activists and supporters and civil society activists.

Throughout this period, Zimbabwean civil society has taken an active role in documenting human rights violations, defending victims of human rights abuses and assisting them in obtaining redress through the courts and other bodies. In 2003 an important meeting was convened in Johannesburg to “explore how best to achieve justice in the broadest possible sense for many victims of past and present human rights abuses in Zimbabwe”. The gathering emerged with a set of minimum demands for mechanisms that could be used to address the wrongs of the past.

It is against this background – the threat of state sponsored violence and a determined civil society – that transitional justice options need to be negotiated. Responding to this need, the inclusive government has appointed three Ministers of State (one from each political party) to the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation. This grouping has begun to consult various stakeholders on the way forward with regard to national healing and reconciliation. What remains to be seen in this regard is the extent to which nationwide consultations with ordinary citizens, those most affected by the cycles of violence, torture and intimidation, will be included in the process.

Part of the Zimbabwean conundrum begs the question of how perpetrators of such abuse can be held accountable in the building of a new Zimbabwe? Human rights activists in Zimbabwe and elsewhere have made their desire for a new political dispensation in Zimbabwe clearly known. The reality is, however, that Zimbabwean society is well aware of the need for caution in making pronouncements on how best to deal with those allegedly responsible for gross violations of human rights. There is clear recognition that both internal and external demands and messaging for transitional justice must be couched very carefully in language that does not alienate or lead to strengthening the resolve of certain individuals to remain in political office. Such contributions must be cautious and cognisant of the kind of tangible impact the lack of care has on work in Zimbabwean communities. 2008 was awash with numerous examples of the kind of violent backlash in store for the Zimbabwean population from such pressures exerted on ZANU-PF leadership. What remains imperative is that unrealistic expectations are not created amongst victims because of insensitivity to the shortcomings and opportunities specific to an inevitable political compromise in a yet-to-be-concluded transition; and that Zimbabweans are allowed and enabled to develop their own discourse and agenda for transition at a time and in a form that they regard as appropriate.

With the proliferation of transitional justice processes worldwide come expectations that a peace agreement needs to be followed by a national process to establish accountability for political crimes – and preferably also by prosecutions. The internationalisation of this expectation is an important step in the fight against gross violations of human rights in Africa and elsewhere. It cannot, however, by itself bring an end to atrocities in Zimbabwe. Experiences in other African countries, the DRC, Sudan and Uganda among them, have taught us that local ownership of a transitional process needs to take precedence over what local players often see as “ready-made” international solutions to the quest for peace in particular situations.

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## Fact Sheet

### Basics<sup>1</sup>

<b>Capital</b>	<b>Harare</b>
Total population (millions), 2009 est	11,4
<b>Population distribution, 2008 %</b>	
Urban	37
Rural	63
Population annual growth rate (%), 2005-15	1.53
HDI (ranking out of 179 countries), 2007	151
<b>Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and older), 2005</b>	
Female	87.2
Male	94.2
<b>Health</b>	
Life expectancy at birth (years), 2010	45.77
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births), 2010	32.31
HIV prevalence (% aged 15-49), 2007	15.3

### Demographics

<b><i>Ethnicity, 2010</i></b>		<b><i>Religion, 2010</i></b>	
Shona	82%	Syncretic (part Christian, part indigenous beliefs)	50%
Ndebele	14%	Christian	25%

<sup>1</sup> Information taken from the Central Intelligence Agency, Government of the United States of America, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html> [accessed 5 May 2010]

Other	2%	Indigenous Beliefs	24%
Asian & mixed	1%	Muslim and other	1%
White	less than 1%		

### Economy

<b>GDP (US\$ millions), 2009</b>	332
GDP per capita (US\$), 2009	less than \$100
Inequality measures (Gini Coefficient Index)	50.1
<b>GDP- Composition by sector (%), 2010</b>	
Agriculture	19.1
Industry	23.6
Services	56.9(2009 est.)
Other	-
<b>Government Expenditure (as % of GDP)</b>	
Education, 2000	4.6
Health, 2004	3.5
Military, 2006	3.8
Total debt service (as % of GDP), 2005	2