



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Executive Summary

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been in a state of civil unrest since its independence from Belgium in 1960. The country endured harsh forms of colonial exploitation, while the post-independence years were amongst the most violent and conflict-ridden of any African state.

The 32-year autocratic rule of Mobutu Sese Seko came to end in 1997 when the Alliance des Forces Democratiques de Liberation (AFDL), with the support of Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces, saw the installation of Laurent-Désiré Kabila as President. A second war emerged when Kabila turned against his Rwandan and Uganda allies, drawing a response from other African states (Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia) in support of the Kabila government.

A rebel authority, the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD) established itself in Goma and, for the duration of the second war, exerted *de facto* political, administrative and military control over three eastern provinces (Maniema, North and South Kivu), effectively dividing the country into two roughly equal parts. Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC) and The Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) were effectively split, with their allegiance divided between the Kabila government in the West, the MLC under Bemba in the North, and the RCD rebel administration in the East. In their turn, exiled Rwandan groups, including some of those responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (*génocidaires*), engaged in military attacks on Rwanda, resulting in counter attacks by Rwandan forces. They were supported by some Mai-Mai¹ militia groups committed to ending the occupation by foreign forces of the eastern provinces.

Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. With the sustained involvement of the United Nations and regional powers including South Africa, the Congolese war formally ended in December 2002 following the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords, and the official withdrawal of the Ugandan and Rwandan troops. Fighting and insecurity, however, continued in many parts of North and South Kivu, as the fundamental causes of the war had not been addressed. These included the illegal exploitation of mineral resources, which had steadily gained in volume since the start of the war; It should also be noted that the Lusaka Peace Accords, ground-breaking as they were in terms of bringing to an end the long-running DRC conflict, failed to address many

¹ Traditional warriors drawn from ethnic communities particularly in North and South Kivu, united in a broad military front to defend Congo's territorial integrity against the Rwandan and Ugandan armies.

underlying issues and indeed, sowed the seeds for new discord in the future. Most notably, the Accords contained a clause stipulating the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was to deal with remaining obstacles to peace in that country.

The involvement of UN peacekeepers, democratic elections in 2006, and joint military operations undertaken by the Congolese and Rwandan armies in 2009 to disband the FDLR with the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP) rebel faction in the Kivu provinces, aimed at creating new opportunities for peace and stability in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. There are at the same time many obstacles to sustainable peace. These include material inequity, the looting and exploitation of minerals, a chronic humanitarian crisis and *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) combatants remaining on Congolese soil. In a country where the roots of conflict remain largely unaddressed, ethnic manipulation for particularist interests remains a threat.

Abbreviations

AFDL	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire</i> (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire)
CNDP	<i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i> (National Congress for the Defence of the People)
CNS	<i>Conférence Nationale Souveraine</i> (Sovereign National Conference)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAR	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i> (Rwandan Armed Forces)
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i> (FDLR) (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda)
FLNC	<i>Front de Libération Nationale du Congo</i> (Congoese National Liberation Front)
MLC	<i>Mouvement de Libération du Congo</i> (Congoese Liberation Movement)
MPR	<i>Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution</i> (Popular Revolutionary Movement)
PDSC	<i>Parti Démocrate Social Chrétien</i> (Democratic Social Christian Party)
PPRD	<i>Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie</i> (Peoples Party for Reconstruction and Democracy)
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i> (Congoese Rally for Democracy)
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
UDPS	<i>Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social</i> (Union for Democracy and Social Progress)
UFERI	<i>Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains Indépendants</i> (Union of Independent Federalists and Republicans)
USOR	<i>Union Sacréé de l'Opposition Radicale</i> (Sacred Union of the Radical Opposition)

Introduction

The continuing crisis in what is today called the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has roots reaching deep into colonial times of King Leopold II, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba following independence in 1960, and the corrupt and autocratic rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko. The situation was further aggravated by the arrival in 1994 of Rwandan Hutu *génocidaires* and civilians, who crossed the border into the eastern provinces of the Congo fleeing the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces. While Mobutu was largely supportive of the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda, the presence of large numbers of presumed *génocidaires* brought the DRC into direct conflict with the incoming Rwandan government and exacerbated the already tense ethnic relations in the region.

The major determinants of ongoing instability in post-colonial DRC are state decay and failed governance under the rule of Mobutu. A covert supporter of the Hutu genocidaire regime, Mobutu was overthrown in 1997 by a coalition of Rwandan and Congolese forces under the banner of the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL), sponsored by Rwanda and Uganda, and headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila under whose rule a measure of peace was established in the country. The coalition collapsed shortly after the taking of Kinshasa by the AFDL, following disagreements between Kabila and his Rwandan backers on the sharing of political power. Pogroms directed against Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis exacerbated the tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali.

The Rwandans duly withdrew from Kinshasa, but gathered support in the eastern border areas, in an attempt to oust Kabila and capture Kinshasa (2nd Congolese war 1998–2002). This attempt was thwarted by the enlistment of Zimbabwean, Namibian and Angolan forces to shore up the weak army of President Kabila. The latter was assassinated in January 2001 and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila. Elections were held in 2006 and Joseph Kabila emerged as the nation's first democratically-elected President since independence.

Early History

Early records reveal a range of small-scale segmentary societies, organised into village communities engaging in trading activities and social interactions that resulted in a measure of cultural homogeneity among otherwise distinctive communities. Then, from the 15th to the 17th century, several state systems emerged – the Kongo kingdom in the west and the Luba and Lunda empires in the east. Each developed elaborate political structures, supported by military forces. Typically, power spread from a centralised royal house to the outlying areas through the intermediation of chiefs and local clan heads. While competition for power, including the kingship, was a feature of the separate kingdoms, the emergence of slave-trading activities became a new source of instability in the region. Most clans and tribes resisted, while others co-operated with the slave traders.

The history of the Kongo peoples in the 16th century illustrates the extent to which the Atlantic slave trade created powerful vested interests among provincial chiefs, lessening the capacity of the kingdom to resist the encroachments of its neighbours. By the late 16th century the Kongo kingdom had virtually succumbed to the attacks of warriors from the east. Two centuries later the Lunda and Luba peoples underwent a similar process of

internal fragmentation followed by attacks from various interlopers eager to control the trade in slaves and ivory. On the eve of the European conquest, local political institutions were fractious and oppressive. The relative ease with which Congolese societies yielded to the European conquest bears testimony to the profound internal dislocations most of them had experienced in the course of previous centuries.

European conquest

European interests in Africa grew rapidly as Henry Morton Stanley charted the course of the Congo River, with his explorations being made possible by his benefactor King Leopold II of Belgium who made available “a powerful private army, equipped with a thousand quick-firing rifles, a dozen small Krupp canon, and four machine guns.” At the Berlin Conference (1884-5) Leopold’s claim to the territory, which he named the Congo Free State, gained international recognition.

In the face of reported atrocities in the area and under a barrage of international criticism, the Belgian parliament eventually voted in favour of annexation of the territory in 1908. Notwithstanding its elimination of the more brutal aspects of Leopold’s Congo Free State, Belgian colonial rule largely continued the paternalism, profiteering and political controls put in place by Leopold. Congolese resistance at the same time intensified, coming to expression through a range of local religious and cultural movements as well as through tribal uprisings.

Independence

As decolonisation movements swept through central Africa and constitutional reforms were introduced in neighbouring French-speaking territories, social unrest in the Congo developed into nationalist sentiment and activity. Amidst growing turbulence, the Belgian government convened a Round Table Conference in Brussels in January 1960 to explore conditions for a viable transfer of power. Six months later, on 30 June 1960, the Congo formally gained independence. Joseph Kasa-Vubu was named President and Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister. The handing-over ceremony was marked by animosity. The Belgian king extolled the virtues of colonial rule, and Lumumba was outraged. Although not scheduled to speak at the ceremony, Lumumba delivered a scathing attack on the departing Belgians.

Within days of independence, Congolese hopes for a successful transition floundered. First, units of the "*Force Publique*" – the national army – mutinied. A few days later, the country's richest province, Katanga, declared itself independent. In the chaos that followed, Belgium declared itself obliged to intervene, ostensibly to protect the lives of Belgian citizens. To the surprise of the newly-installed Congolese government, Belgium landed troops in Katanga in support of the secessionist regime. Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba appealed to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld for UN security assistance, but soon disagreed among themselves on the role and limitations of the UN peacekeeping force. Lumumba insisted that the UN should use force to bring Katanga back into the domain of central government, while Kasa-Vubu favoured a measure of local autonomy for the provinces. Disappointed by the response from the West, Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union for logistic assistance – with the Congo becoming entangled in the machinations of cold war politics.

President Kasa-Vubu relieved Lumumba of his duties. Lumumba contested the legality of his dismissal and responded by dismissing Kasa-Vubu. In the ensuing constitutional impasse, government effectively ground to a halt. Moreover, a process of fragmentation set in motion by the Katanga secession grew, resulting in the break-up of the country into four separate areas (Katanga, Kasai, Orientale Province, and Léopoldville).

Mobutism

On 14 September 1960 the Congolese army leader, Colonel Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko), announced that the army, with the help of a caretaker government, would henceforth rule the country. He later reached a working agreement with Kasa-Vubu and in October 1960 the General Assembly of the UN recognised his government. The ousted Lumumba was apprehended by Kasa-Vubu's forces and arrested. On 17 January 1961, he was handed over to the Katanga secessionist regime and killed, reportedly with the collusion of Belgian officers and the support of United States (US) intelligence agencies. Kasa-Vubu's surrender of Lumumba to the Katanga secessionists was supposedly intended as an exchange for a reintegration of the province into the ambit of central government. However, it was not until January 1963 that the secession was decisively crushed – and even then, only after a violent showdown between the Belgian-trained Katanga gendarmerie and the UN forces.

In the meantime, rural insurgencies in the provinces were raising the ominous prospect of a total collapse of the central government. Former leader of the Katanga secession, Moïse Tshombe, became Prime Minister on July 10 1964, and formed another short-lived administration. On 24 November 1965, for the second time, Mobutu seized control of government. This time he consolidated his rule. The country's sole legal political party, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR) became the primary instrument of Mobutu's control. Officially described as "the nation politically organised", the MPR was effectively a patronage system, supported by a single-party state, with Mobutism the legitimising formula. In 1970, through a tightly controlled election, Mobutu was elected unopposed as President of a country that he renamed "Zaire".

Mobutu established himself as a strong ally of the West and reaped the benefits of this move. Western powers, most notably France and the US, propped up his regime. During the cold war the West provided unprecedented caches of weapons and training to his troops. Mobutu used this to consolidate his power against his political rivals. At the same time, Mobutu and his political allies funnelled billions of dollars of state money into private bank accounts in the West, laying the foundations for the country's reputation as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. On two occasions, friendly governments intervened to save the Mobutu regime. In 1977 and 1978, the country's main opposition movement, the *Front de Libération Nationale du Congo* (FLNC) operating from Angola, instigated two major invasions into the country. Morocco and France came successively to Mobutu's rescue.

It was not until the end of the cold war, under pressure from opposition parties and foreign donors, that Mobutu was forced to declare an end to the one-party state and introduce measures designed to allow for the growth of political pluralism. Within days of the announcement of democratisation in April 1990, almost 400 political parties had sprung up, most notably the *Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains Indépendants* (UFERI) led by Nguz a Karl-i-Bond, the *Parti Démocrate Social Chrétien* (PDSC) led by Joseph Ileo, the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS) led by Etienne Tshisekedi, and the umbrella organisation, *Union Sacré de l'Opposition Radicale* (USOR), which consisted of 130 smaller

parties. Ten days after making the announcement, Mobutu changed his mind, announcing that political parties were not legal and were therefore not authorised to engage in political activities.

Mobutu at the same time acceded to demands for a national conference that would debate constitutional reform and transition to a new democratic form of government. In 1991 the national conference on political reform known as the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS) was convened. The CNS adopted a political and institutional framework for democratic transition, voting in addition to return the country to its original name of Congo. The comprehensive political compromise also resulted in Etienne Tshisekedi's election as Prime Minister and head of the transitional government. However, Mobutu refused to accept the legitimacy of the transitional authorities or of any constitution it might formulate. He dismissed Tshisekedi and the transitional government. The country slid back into chaos, with Mobutu deploying military units to obstruct the emergence of any meaningful transitional process. Two military rebellions (1991 and 1993) broke out because of the non-payment of the Zairean armed forces which resulted in the looting of Kinshasa. The economy was close to collapse. Inflation sky rocketed to close to 10 000% in 1994 and production in the resource-laden eastern provinces was reduced to a fraction of what it had been in previous year.

The Rwandan genocide

The balance of power within the Great Lakes generally, and the DRC specifically, shifted dramatically in the events which followed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Fleeing the RPF onslaught in Rwanda, approximately two million Rwandan Hutu refugees poured into the Congo's Kivu provinces.. Among them were a significant number of *Interahamwe* and *ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) *génocidaires*. With Mobutu's sanction and the unwitting support of international aid agencies that sought to alleviate the refugee crisis, the *génocidaires* used the opportunity to establish their hold over the exile communities – with systems of administration and control reflecting their military command structures – in refugee camps set up close to the border with Rwanda. Forced recruitment into their ranks was widespread. The local population was, in effect, held hostage by the massive presence of *génocidaires* among the refugees. One leading international aid agency, *Médecins Sans Frontiers*, withdrew from the situation on ethical grounds. A number of others instituted wide-ranging policy reviews as a direct result of ethnic mobilisation in the camps.

On the ground, ethnic politics in the eastern DRC were altering dramatically, with tensions escalating between local communities and people with Rwandan linkage, which included the bulk of civilian refugees. The Banyamulenge, a Tutsi-linked group opposed to then President Mobutu Sese Seko, were told to leave the country. They resisted, turning to Rwanda for help.

Rwanda's determination to deal with the *génocidaires* conducting cross-border raids from the camps in Kivu was growing. Uganda had also become frustrated with the chaotic conditions in the Congo and the base it was providing for anti-government Ugandan militia. A coalition committed to overthrowing the Mobutu regime rapidly formed, calling itself the

Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Their formal leader was Congolese, a long-time opponent of Mobutu's regime, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. With only a few troops of his own, he was dependent on military support provided by Rwanda and Uganda. As the foreign-backed AFDL swept through the country with extraordinary rapidity, reaching Kinshasa in the space of seven months, the Zairean army withdrew. With Kinshasa on the brink of surrender Mobutu fled to Morocco, where he died in September 1997.

Laurent Kabila

Laurent-Désiré Kabila was installed as head of government and the country renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In recognition for the support which had been received from Rwanda, many key positions in government and the security apparatus were given to ethnic Tutsis. However, hopes that the overthrow of Mobutu would restore peace to the country were short-lived. Whereas in the initial phases of his rule minor changes were made to build morale and national sentiment, Kabila failed to address the patterns of abuse that had marked the Congo under Mobutu. His brief rule was marked by a failure to protect human rights and civil liberties as well as deteriorating relations with former allies Rwanda and Uganda.

Cross-border attacks by Rwandan dissidents based in the eastern DRC escalated tensions between the Kabila regime and Rwanda. The presence of Rwandan troops and officials in Kinshasa, in turn, deeply offended local sensibilities. In July 1998 Kabila expelled all foreign advisors and troops, precipitating violent attacks on persons of Tutsi origin in Kinshasa. Retreating eastwards, Rwandan forces joined forces with disgruntled elements amongst the Banyamulenge population, and former "Mobutists", thus precipitating a second war (1998 – 2002) which resulted directly or indirectly in over three million deaths². A wide variety of military groupings became involved with Rwanda again, spearheading a new attack on the capital.

Chiefly as a result of intervention by Angola and Zimbabwe the capital and most of the western part of the country survived the onslaught. The east remained under the control of the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), a coalition of former Mobutist officials and other opponents of President Kabila backed by neighbouring countries. The movement controlled the larger towns in the east, while the rural areas were reduced to a patchwork of fiefdoms, controlled by a range of military groups, many of whom joined in the rush to claim the spoils of war. A war that had, ostensibly, been waged over territorial concerns became extremely profitable, with high-ranking Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan military officials among the leading beneficiaries. It is estimated that within a three-year period, state mining assets worth US\$5 billion were transferred to private companies. The mineral-rich eastern provinces became particularly contentious as occupying forces plundered the gold, diamonds, coltan and other minerals so rife in the area. The Congo's fragile, porous eastern borders remained arenas of conflict, shaped by the presence of armed opposition groups from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. The Rwandan armed groups

² International Rescue Committee

in particular, by then converted into a political movement called the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), held swathes of territory enclosing mineral deposits in which they traded. This contributed and contributes to their ongoing military strength. In many places they have set up their own territorial administrations in the DRC and intermarried with the local population, a situation which persists to the present day, and complicates repatriation efforts.

Transitional rule

After numerous failed attempts, extensive mediation by Zambian President Frederic Chiluba led to a cease-fire and the Lusaka Peace Accord was signed in July 1999 by the heads of state of Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and over fifty rebel leaders. It provided for a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC, the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force and political dialogue aimed at the establishment of a new dispensation which included the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards on 16 January 2001 in circumstances which are still unclear.

The son of Laurent-Desire, Joseph Kabila, was installed by the military as President. He took steps to make peace with his neighbours, committed himself to holding democratic elections and revived the Inter-Congolese Dialogue first introduced by Mobutu and partially revived by Laurent Kabila. He reached an agreement with most of the existing armed opposition groups on a set of principles to guide negotiations for peace and a new political dispensation in the country.

This opened the way for a series of meetings leading to the Sun City talks in South Africa in 2002, which resulted in a power-sharing process, following an intervention by South Africa. Kabila was supported by four deputy presidents representing the former government, the non-armed opposition groups, the anti-Kabila RCD and Bemba's *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC). The thus-formed interim government was to be in office for a three-year transitional period ending with elections in 2006.

Congolese civil society by and large seized the newfound political space to advocate socio-political transformation in a number of areas. Yet the transition is widely recognised as a failure; the political will of some then in government to make the move towards elections was lacking. Many party leaders, ministers and public officials did not expect to survive democratic elections and were content to either prolong the transition or have it collapse. The nature of the transitional government, composed as it was of four diverse factions, effectively hampered collaboration.

National elections

The largest peace-keeping force in the world, comprising 17 000 UN troops and 2 000 European Union (EU) forces, was deployed in the country, with security remaining a matter of major concern – primarily in the country's eastern provinces. A proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission effectively collapsed and yet, despite the fact that preparations for elections were coming under strain, 25 million Congolese were registered to vote.

Notwithstanding many gloomy predictions, the outcome of the elections was accepted as a fair reflection of the will of the Congolese people, having been monitored by approximately 5 000 national and 500 international observers. There were reports of irregularities and the outcome was challenged by Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC. The results of the elections were, however, upheld. Kabila's *Parti du Peuple pour la Réconstruction et la Démocratie* (PPRD) won 111 parliamentary seats, Bemba's MLC 64 and the remaining seats were divided between other parties in a 500-seat parliament. A second round of presidential elections was required between Kabila and Bemba. Kabila won with 58% of the vote. When the outcome was challenged again by Bemba, it was upheld by the Supreme Court.

Bemba soon found himself in conflict with Kabila's government. This resulted in several armed skirmishes between his militia and government forces. Claiming his life was in danger, he took refuge in the South African Embassy in Kinshasa, from where he went into exile. He was arrested in Brussels for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by his troops in Central Africa in 2002-03. The case was transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague where he is presently on trial. The MLC interpreted his arrest as an initiative by the Kabila government to undermine the democratisation process in the DRC.

Bemba's exile and arrest, together with other arrests in the DRC, point to a less than settled political milieu in the country. These include the arrest and trial of rebel leader Thomas Lubanga in The Hague for war crimes relating to the forced recruitment of child soldiers in Ituri District. While sending a strong message to warlords that they are not beyond the law, Lubanga's arrest has inflamed an already fragile ethnic situation in the eastern part of the country where he is seen as a protector of Hema rights in the ethnic rivalry for control of the region's vast mineral resources.

Having led an uprising against the Kabila government in North Kivu, Laurent Nkunda, former head of the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP), was arrested in a joint Congolese-Rwandan operation. (See the *Rwandan profile* included in this "Profile Series".)

The signing of an historic peace accord in January 2008, in the North Kivu provincial capital of Goma, between some 23 armed factions including the CNDP and key Mai-Mai groups, has been a timid step in resolving security sector reform and bringing about the integration. The DRC authorities promised to grant an amnesty to members of about 20 armed groups from North and South Kivu provinces, under which they would not face retribution for acts of war and insurrection committed during fighting in the two provinces which has displaced and killed hundreds of thousands of people. Significantly, the FDLR were not included in this accord; the failure to address this issue remains one of the main causes of continuing instability in the region.

The gradual *rapprochement* taking place since 2006 between Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame has culminated in the joint Congolese-Rwandan military campaign to put an end to the illegal FDLR presence in the DRC (in February and March 2009). This development is potentially positive if it is successful in neutralising all FDLR activity, a daunting task given

the wide geographical cover and difficult terrain. It also creates an opportunity for the CNDP to search for solutions to its ethnic concerns through peaceful means. However, the lack of public consultation and the failure to include Parliament and the Senate in decisions taken on the intended intervention have dealt another blow to the popularity of President Kabila.

Ethnic and material interests remain intertwined in the DRC. This has been the case particularly in the eastern parts of the country, where gold, tin, coltan, niobium, diamonds, timber and other natural resources are extensive. Issues of ethnic identity have been deeply entrenched in the DRC and successfully exploited by national and regional leaders in the area. This makes the DRC, and more particularly its eastern provinces, a microcosm of a regional problem. If not resolved here, it is inevitable that conflict will continue to destabilise the entire region.

DRC Factsheet

Basics ³	
Capital	Kinshasa
Total population (millions), 2009	68.7
Population distribution, 2009	
Urban	34
Rural	66
Population annual growth rate (%), 2005-15	3.2
HDI (ranking out of 179 countries), 2005 ⁴	168
Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and older), 1995-2005	67.2
Health	
Life expectancy at birth (years), 2005	54.4
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births), 2005	81
HIV prevalence (% aged 15-49), 2005	4.2

³ Information taken from the UNDP Human Development Report 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_COD.html [accessed 6 May 2010]

⁴ The United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI) is calculated using the following indicators: Gross enrolment ratio (GER), Adult literacy rate, Life expectancy at birth and GDP per capita (PPP US\$).

Demographics⁵		
<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Religion</i>	
Over 200 ethnic groups, of which 45%:	Roman Catholic	50%
Mongo	Protestant	20%
Luba	Kimbanguist	10%
Kongo	Muslim	10%
Mangbetu-Azande	Other	10%

Economy⁶	
GDP (US\$ billions), 2009	21.3
GDP per capita (US\$), 2009	300
Inequality measures (Gini Coefficient Index)	Not Available
GDP- Composition by sector (%), 2000 ⁷	
Agriculture	55
Industry	11
Services	34
Other	-
Imports of goods and services (as % of GDP), 2005	39
Exports of goods and services (as % of GDP), 2005	32
Government Expenditure (as % of GDP)	
Education, 2002-5	Not Available
Health, 2004	1.1
Military, 2005	2.4

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⁵ Information taken from the Central Intelligence Agency, Government of the United States of America, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html> [accessed 6 May 2010]

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